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STRUCTURING PRE-PLEA CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
Daniel S. McConkie∗
Ninety-seven percent of federal defendants plead guilty,1and they rely on prosecutors for
much of the information about the government’s case on which the decision to plead is based.
Although federal prosecutors routinely turn over most necessary discovery to the defense, the
law does not require them to turn over any discovery before the guilty plea. This can lead to
innocent defendants pleading guilty and to guilty defendants pleading guilty without
information that could have affected the agreed-upon sentence.
This article argues that the lack of a judicially enforceable pre-plea discovery regime
flouts structural protections that due process is supposed to provide. Defendants who plead
not guilty and go to trial get a jury to adjudicate guilt and a judge to preside over the
proceedings and pronounce sentence. The judge and jury hear an adversarial presentation of
the evidence, and the judge at sentencing can consider an even broader spectrum of
information about the defendant and the crime. But defendants who plead guilty effectively
act as their own judge and jury. Unfortunately, because prosecutors are not required to
provide any pre-plea discovery, the defendant who pleads guilty may not have nearly as much
information as the judge and jury would have had at trial and sentencing.
The Supreme Court has employed a balancing test to determine whether a particular
procedure comports with due process. This article proposes tailoring that test to the pre-plea
discovery context. The proposed test would ask (1) whether the defense is getting sufficient
information before the guilty plea to promote accurate sorting of the innocent from the guilty
and reasonably informed and consistent sentencing; (2) whether there are there clear rules
that allow judges, before a guilty plea, to regulate prosecutors’ decision not to disclose; and
(3) whether the production of pre-plea discovery in a given case imposes undue costs on
society.
One hopeful development is that several district courts, pursuant to Congressionallygranted authority, have promulgated local rules for pre-plea discovery. I argue that these
time-testes local rule innovations should be incorporated into the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to give clear standards to prosecutors and authority to judges to enforce
expansive pre-plea discovery.

Assistant Professor, Northern Illinois University. J.D., Stanford Law School, 2004. Former Assistant
United States Attorney (Sacramento), 2008–2013. My sincerest thanks to the BYU Law School
Faculty Workshops, the Arizona Junior Scholars Forum (especially Cecelia M. Kingele, Jason Kreag
and Jordan Blair Woods), the Northwestern University Law School’s Legal Scholarship Workshop
(especially James T. Lindgren), Mark G. Kelman, Lawrence C. Marshall, and Evan J. Criddle for
helpful feedback. I am also grateful to my research assistants, Carla Davis-Bey, Becky Perez, Camie
Wood, and Whitney Wilkinson. Any errors herein are my own, but this article has benefitted greatly
from my generous colleagues.
1
United States Sentencing Commission Annual Report 2012, Chapter 5, UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION (2012), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2012/2012_Annual_Report_Chap5.pdf.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider the unusual case of a federal criminal defendant who is tried by a
jury. That defendant has constitutional and statutory rights to discovery, which
are necessary for him to prepare a defense. The jury adjudicates guilt based on
an adversarial presentation of evidence presided over by a neutral judge. If the
jury convicts, the judge can consider an even broader quantity of information
to determine a just sentence.
Now, consider the more typical defendant who pleads guilty. In doing so,
he adjudicates his own guilt and agrees to his own sentence. No jury hears the
evidence, and the plea agreement may leave little or no room for the judge to
exercise much sentencing discretion. In effect, that defendant acts as his own
judge and jury. Another key feature of the guilty plea is that the defendant
may plead guilty with much less information than the judge and jury had in
the trial scenario. True, federal prosecutors routinely provide pre-plea
discovery as they see fit, but federal defendants have no statutory or
constitutional rights defining the appropriate scope of such disclosures.
In the trial example, a conviction requires structural protections consistent
with separation of powers principles. First, there needs to be a concurrence of
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the tri-partite branches: the prosecutor (executive) brings charges according to
the law (passed by the legislature), and the pre-trial proceedings, trial and
sentencing are presided over by a judge. Next, the jury serves as a nongovernmental check on the power of the state to deprive its citizens –
consistent with due process – of life, liberty, or property. In contrast, in the
guilty plea example, there was no trial jury, and the judge may have done little
more than accept the guilty plea and pronounce sentence according to the
terms of the plea agreement. The prosecutor was the dominant player,
choosing her charges and her defendants and leveraging guilty pleas with the
threat of a higher sentence.2
Another key difference between the two examples is the flow of
information to the decision-maker. In the trial example, the defendant had
statutory and constitutional rights to pre-trial discovery. He could seek judicial
enforcement of his statutory rights at any stage in the case, although his
constitutional discovery rights were only enforceable after the trial. But in the
guilty plea example, the defendant had no such rights. He pleaded guilty based
on his own independent knowledge of the case and the information that the
prosecution, in its sole discretion, chose to provide.
This flow of information is critical to the proper disposition of criminal
cases. Innocent defendants need evidence in the prosecution’s possession that
tends to demonstrate their innocence. Without that information, they may
plead guilty to cut their losses. Even guilty defendants need information from
the prosecution to rationally plea bargain and to be sentenced consistently
with other cases. For example, a drug trafficker’s sentence depends in large
part on the quantity of drugs trafficked. But without access to lab reports, the
trafficker may not be aware of the quantity and purity involved. Likewise,
members of a large fraud ring may not even know of each other’s existence,
but evidence that inculpates one defendant may exculpate another. These two
examples illustrate how inculpatory evidence is relevant not only to guilt, but
also to sentencing. Because plea deals routinely decide both the charges of
conviction and the sentencing consequences, even guilty defendants need
enough information about the government’s evidence against them to make an
informed decision about whether to waive their constitutional rights. And if
prosecutorial discretion is not regulated by consistent, enforceable rules for
This is often referred to as the “trial penalty,” meaning the differential between the sentence offered
as part of the plea deal and the sentence imposed after trial.
2

Structuring Pre-Plea Criminal Discovery

[11/10/15]

pre-plea discovery, similarly situated defendants may strike different plea
bargains based solely on differing amounts of criminal discovery that they
happen to receive from the prosecutor assigned to the case.
Our justice system’s structural protections for defendants are weakened
without a strong flow of information from the prosecution. As a practical
matter, prosecutors generally have access to the entire contents of the criminal
investigation and the case against the defendant. Congress and the Supreme
Court have formulated discovery rules for a trial-based procedure. Judges
have enforced these rules, thereby greatly increasing the flow of information
to the defense, benefitting defendants (especially innocent ones) and society.
In contrast, for the vast majority of defendants who plead guilty, federal
prosecutors give up only as much pre-plea discovery as they feel is
appropriate, according to agency policies, ethical rules, and their own
individual discretion. They have no statutory or constitutional obligation
before a guilty plea to turn over discovery that helps the defendant
(“exculpatory evidence”), although the Department of Justice generally
requires prosecutors to turn over exculpatory evidence (but not evidence that
could impeach a government witness) before a guilty plea. They routinely turn
over enough evidence that hurts the defendant (“inculpatory evidence”) to
incentivize the guilty plea, but prosecutors may not recognize when evidence
could help the defendant, and without any real possibility that a judge will
force them to hand over certain categories of pre-plea discovery, prosecutors
are not likely to do so. On the other hand, too much pre-plea discovery
threatens the efficient operation of plea bargaining and other public interests,
such as the safety of witnesses.
The Supreme Court has not decided whether plea bargaining defendants
have a general right to discovery of exculpatory evidence.3 The Court has
already decided that such defendants have no right to discovery of inculpatory
evidence.4 But that holding is in tension with an oft-repeated principle running
through the Court’s Due Process and Compulsory Process jurisprudence:
providing defendants with information relevant to the preparation of their
The Supreme Court has concluded that plea bargaining defendants have no right to
impeachment evidence, but that is only one category of exculpatory evidence. See discussion
of United States v. Ruiz, Part III (B), infra.
4
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977).
3
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defense enables the adversary system to properly function so that juries can
adjudicate accurately and judges can sentence fairly.
Although scholars have written extensively about how plea bargaining has
consolidated power in the prosecution generally, no one has critiqued this
consolidation of power in pre-plea discovery. 5 In fact, the failure of Congress
and the Supreme Court to regulate pre-plea discovery has likely reduced the
accuracy of adjudication and increased unwarranted disparities in sentencing.
In Part I, I discuss the importance of checks and balances in the criminal
justice system between prosecutors, trial judges, and the trial jury. Plea
bargaining has consolidated too much power in prosecutors, and the absence
of constraints on prosecutors in plea-plea discovery is a good example.
Factually innocent defendants need pre-plea discovery because, if they are
unaware of hard evidence in the government’s possession that would
exonerate them, they might rationally decide to plead guilty. But even
factually guilty defendants need inculpatory evidence against them for several
reasons: the adversary system cannot function unless the defense is adequately
informed; evidence that appears inculpatory might, in the hands of the
defense, prove to be exculpatory or mitigating; and sentencing across cases
may be inconsistent unless prosecutors are guided by clear, judicially
enforceable rules.
In Part II, I discuss how due process is closely related to separation of
powers principles: the executive should not enforce the law except through a
courtroom procedure presided over by neutral decision-makers (judges and
juries). The Brady rule restrains executive discretion in discovery for
exculpatory evidence but not for apparently inculpatory evidence that might
be relevant and helpful to the defense at trial. 6 But in other discovery cases
decided outside of the Brady line, the Supreme Court has applied a pre-trial
materiality test that measures the potential use of the information to the
defense. Such a test would result in broader pre-plea discovery. A novel
contribution of my article is that it highlights the tension between Supreme
Court cases that acknowledge the importance of adequate discovery in
See infra, note 7. This article does not address the discovery that the defense owes the
prosecution, because the information deficit in criminal cases disadvantages the defense more
than the prosecution.
6
See Part II(B), infra.
5
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preparing a defense and other cases in which the Supreme Court has refused
to extend discovery rights to pre-plea discovery.
In Part III, I describe how criminal due process has come to favor
balancing tests based on Mathews v. Eldridge7 that are flexible enough to
accommodate modern procedural problems, like pre-plea discovery.
Unfortunately, when the Supreme Court had the opportunity in 2002 to apply
such a test to pre-plea discovery in United States v. Ruiz, it failed to recognize
that plea bargaining defendants need enforceable discovery rights to
potentially exculpatory information. I propose taking the Mathews v. Eldridge
test and tailoring it to the pre-plea discovery context. My proposed test (a
blueprint for future reforms) asks (1) whether the defense (acting as its own
judge and jury) is getting sufficient information before the guilty plea to
promote both accurate sorting of the innocent from the guilty and reasonably
informed and consistent sentencing; (2) whether there are there clear judicial
standards to review the prosecutor’s decision not to disclose that can be
enforced before the guilty plea; and (3) whether the production of pre-plea
discovery imposes undue costs on society.
My claim is modest: I do not argue that due process necessarily requires
general discovery of both exculpatory and inculpatory evidence. The Supreme
Court has rejected such a requirement in many cases, and it may not be
practical for the Court to make fine-grained, constitutional discovery rules that
balance the relevant interests without spawning litigation that would impede
the efficient operation of plea bargaining, which the Court has consistently
endorsed.
Instead, my balancing test – rooted in both a structural critique and sound
public policy principles – can provide guidance for good discovery rulemaking. In Part IV, I argue that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
should be amended to create a consistent national regime of liberal pre-plea
discovery. Prosecutors’ discretion to withhold discovery needs to be checked,
and judges are the ones to do it. But judges can’t do so efficiently and
consistently without clear procedural rules regulating pre-plea discovery.
Because amendments to Rule 16 do not appear to be forthcoming, I
examine how district courts have used congressionally delegated authority to
promulgate local rules regulating pre-plea discovery. Such rules often create a
7

See Part III(A), infra.
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rebuttable presumption that the prosecution will provide most of the discovery
that Rule 16 requires, and often a good deal more, including exculpatory
evidence, soon after the arraignment. Although defendants who plead guilty
will never have full knowledge of the government’s case, such local rules at
least aim to provide a comparable amount of information to defendants who
plead guilty as to those defendants who go to trial. My structural critique
makes an original contribution to the literature in providing a constitutional
rationale for these local rules by showing how they are consistent with my
proposed due process balancing test. And, although this article focuses on the
federal criminal justice system, much of its analysis is also applicable to state
systems with weak pre-plea discovery regimes.8
I. THE UNCHECKED POWER OF PROSECUTORS TO DENY PRE-PLEA
DISCOVERY
The criminal justice system has historically had its own system of checks
and balances between the legislature, prosecutors, trial judges, and the trial
jury. Plea bargaining has upset the old balance by consolidating too much
power in prosecutors. The lack of a consistent federal plea-plea discovery
regime is a good example of this phenomenon. Plea bargaining defendants
need expansive information about their case to make intelligent decisions
about whether and on what terms to plead guilty. Unfortunately, since federal
prosecutors have unchecked discretion to decide what pre-plea discovery to
provide, defendants do not always get enough information to do so.
A. Plea Bargaining Prosecutors Have Too Much Discretion to Withhold
Discovery
As numerous scholars have noted, plea bargaining procedure has
consolidated too much power into the hands of prosecutors.9 Briefly, this is
because prosecutors choose their defendants and the criminal charges. Those
Some states, like Texas, North Carolina have strong pre-plea discovery rules; others, like Georgia and
Virginia, do not. See Jenia I. Turner and Allison D. Redlich, Two Models Of Pre-Plea Discovery In
Criminal Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV __, *3 [introduction]
(forthcoming 2016).
9
For a sampling of the vast academic literature on this point, see, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler,
The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968); Albert W.
Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059,
1061–1076 (1976); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979,
(1992); GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN
AMERICA 205–30 (2003).
8

Structuring Pre-Plea Criminal Discovery

[11/10/15]

charges carry sentencing consequences, either through mandatory minimums
or advisory guidelines that judges widely follow. Judges, who lack the
resources to provide many jury trials, rarely reject plea agreements, even
though those agreements effectively remove the judge from the adjudication
of the case. Instead, the real adjudication happens in private negotiations
between the prosecutor and the defense attorney, finalized in one brief guilty
plea hearing on the record. The in-court proceedings before the guilty plea are
shortened to minimize the resources expended on the case and maximize the
sentencing discount for the defendant. To assure the defendant that he will
receive the benefit of his bargain, the plea agreement usually limits the
judge’s discretion at sentencing to impose a more severe sentence.10 And
because the defendant waives his right to a jury trial, no jury will ever be
summoned as a populist check on the government’s case. The Supreme Court
has placed few limits on plea bargaining prosecutors.11
Plea bargaining prosecutors likewise have very broad discretion to
withhold pre-plea discovery. The Supreme Court has principally regulated
criminal discovery through the rule of Brady v. Maryland and its progeny. But
by its own terms, Brady is a trial-related rule that does not apply to pre-plea
discovery. 12 (The Supreme Court has declined to extend the Brady rule to preplea discovery of impeachment evidence13 but has not yet decided whether to
extend Brady to pre-plea discovery of other categories of exculpatory

10
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow the parties to specify the precise sentence on a guilty
plea, with the judge’s permission. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C). More frequently, the parties reach
agreements as to certain Sentencing Guideline variables that largely determine the sentence (such as
drug quantity or fraud loss amount). At a minimum, defendants who plead guilty almost always qualify
for the “acceptance of responsibility” reduction under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which
is usually results in about a one-third reduction of the sentence in serious cases. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1
(2004); see also Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial SelfRegulation, 105 COLUM. L.REV. 1010, 1011 n.4, 1012, 1017 n.21 (2005) (collecting citations), G.
NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING 99 (3rd Ed., 2012); Jed S. Rakoff, “Why Innocent People Plead
Guilty,” New York Review of Books, Nov. 20, 2014 (“[T]he vast majority of plea bargains involve
sentencing concessions.”).
(“[T]he plea bargains usually determine the sentences, sometimes as a matter of law and otherwise as a
matter of practice.”)
11
See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (decision whether to prosecute
may not be based on race, religion, or other arbitrary classification).
12
See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002); Part III(B), infra.
13
Id.

Structuring Pre-Plea Criminal Discovery

[11/10/15]

evidence.)14 Only in rare cases will trial judges order pre-trial discovery under
Brady, such as where the defense can describe specific exculpatory evidence
that the prosecution has withheld.15
Congress, through the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, has mandated
far more discovery than Brady requires. Rule 16 requires prosecutors to
produce statements of the defendant, documents and objects relevant to the
case, the defendant’s criminal history, reports of examinations and tests, and
expert witness reports. It requires the defense to produce some reciprocal
discovery. 16 Trial judges have broad discretion to enforce violations of the
rule.17 If there are witness safety concerns, prosecutors can seek a protective
order from the court excusing compliance with discovery requirements.18 Rule
16 does not prescribe time limits on any of the discovery but implies that the
required disclosures are to be made before trial. Critically, the Rule itself does
not require any discovery to be produced before a guilty plea. 19
Outside of Rule 16, the Jencks Act specifies that the parties shall not be
required to produce witness statements (except for those of expert

See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629 (framing issue in terms of whether Brady required pre-plea
disclosure of impeachment information, without reference to other types of exculpatory
evidence). At least one appellate court has found that it likely does. See McCann v.
Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 788 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that it is likely a due process violation
for a prosecutor who is aware of defendant’s innocence to withhold exculpatory evidence
before the guilty plea); see also Daniel Conte, Swept Under the Rug: The Brady Disclosure
Obligation in a Pre-Plea Context, 17 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 74, 80–82
(2012) [hereinafter Conte].
15
See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59 (1987) (“In the typical case where a defendant makes
only a general request for exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, it is the State that decides
which information must be disclosed. Unless defense counsel becomes aware that other exculpatory
evidence was withheld and brings it to the court's attention, the prosecutor's decision on disclosure is
final.”); United States v. Caro-Muniz, 406 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 2005) (rejecting a Brady/Ritchie claim
for failure to specify exculpatory evidence).
16
FED R. CRIM. P. 16.
17
FED R. CRIM. P. 16(d).
18
FED R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1).
19
See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 1 F.3d 51, 53 (1st Cir. 1993) (“Absent bad faith, . . . the
critical time for disclosure of sentence-related information is not prior to the taking of a plea,
but prior to sentencing.”), found in Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea
Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 211 & n. 46 (2006).
14
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witnesses20), until after those witnesses have testified on direct examination at
trial. 21 Obviously, such a rule does not apply to pre-plea discovery.
Other Rules of Criminal Procedure also serve to augment Rule 16
discovery. Rule 17 governs the issuance of defense subpoenas, which can be
issued at any point in the case. Such subpoenas help the defense to obtain
critical evidence.22 Rule 11(d) allows the defendant to withdraw a guilty plea
before the imposition of sentence for a “fair and just reason.” Many federal
courts have adjudicated Brady claims pursuant to this rule.23
The Department of Justice has its own internal discovery guidelines for
federal prosecutors.24 Although Department policy sometimes requires federal
prosecutors to provide more discovery than the law requires,25 it does not
always provide bright-line rules for pre-plea discovery. Instead, the
Department requires line prosecutors to carefully evaluate their discovery
obligations in each case, keeping the broader aims of justice in mind. 26 One
FED R. CRIM. P. 16.
18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2 (codifying Jencks Act and
extending it to other contexts, like suppression motions). Rule 6 specifically excepts grand
jury transcripts from discovery.
22
See discussion of United States v. Nixon in Part II(D)(1), infra.
23
Corinna Barrett Lain, Accuracy Where It Matters: Brady v. Maryland in the Plea
Bargaining Context, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 17 (2002) [hereinafter Lain, Accuracy] (collecting
cases) (cited in R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS 88 (2005) [hereinafter
CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL]). Unfortunately, the “fair and just” standard is amorphous. See
generally Lain, Accuracy, supra note 21, at 18.
24
See Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., on Guidance for Prosecutors
Regarding Criminal Discovery for Department Prosecutors (January 4, 2010) available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00165.htm;
Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att'y Gen., on Requirement for Office
Discovery Policies in Criminal Matters for the Heads of Department Litigating Components
Handling Criminal Matters (Jan. 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/dag-tousas-component-heads.pdf; Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att'y Gen., on
Issuance of Guidance and Summary of Actions Taken in Response to the Report of the
Department of Justice Criminal Discovery and Case Management Working Group for
Department Prosecutors (Jan. 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/dagmemo.pdf; Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att'y Gen., on Guidance for
Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery for Department Prosecutors (Jan. 4, 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/dag/discovery-guidance.pdf; Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr.,
Att'y Gen., on Department Policy on Charging and Sentencing to all Federal Prosecutors
(May 19, 2010), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/holdermemo.pdf.
25
Ellen S. Podgor, Pleading Blindly, 80 MISS. L.J. 1633, 1636–37 (2011) [hereinafter Podger,
Pleading].
26
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
20
21
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important exception is that federal prosecutors must promptly turn over
exculpatory evidence.27
The Department also has an internal division, the Office of Professional
Responsibility, which is charged with administering internal discipline to
prosecutors who violate the law or Department policy. However, instances of
such discipline are few. 28 Federal prosecutors are also required to abide by the
ethical rules of the state in which they practice and subject to discipline by
state bar associations. 29 But state bars are notorious for under-enforcing their
rules of conduct, especially for federal prosecutors.30
In short, federal prosecutors have no legal obligation to provide pre-plea
discovery unless a judge orders it. As I demonstrate in the next section, this
can leave some plea bargaining defendants in the dark.
B. Why Defendants Need Broad Pre-Plea Discovery
In the same way that a trial jury needs expansive information to properly
adjudicate guilt and a trial judge needs even more information to pronounce a
reasonable sentence, defendants need expansive information to intelligently
plead guilty and agree to a sentence, or at least the contours of a sentence.
Before they plead guilty, they need access to both exculpatory and inculpatory
evidence in the prosecutor’s possession.
1. Exculpatory Evidence
The case for exculpatory evidence is straightforward. For factually
innocent defendants (that is, those defendants who did not commit the charged
crimes), broad pre-plea discovery is especially important. Factually innocent
Podgor, supra note 24, at 1638–39. See also OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATT’YS, U.S. ATT’YS
MANUAL: CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, 623–26 (1997); and AUSA Bulletin [whole issue
devoted to criminal discovery]. The Department has given further guidance to prosecutors in a
treatise published as part of the Office of Legal Education’s “Bluebook” series of training
manual. The Criminal Discovery Bluebook, which runs several hundred pages, is not
available to scholars, although the Department of Justice is being sued under the Freedom of
Information Act to release the book.
28
See “Hundreds of Justice Department Attorneys Violated Professional Rules, Laws, or Ethical
Standards,” http://www.pogo.org/our-work/reports/2014/hundreds-of-justice-attorneys-violatedstandards.html, accessed on October 6, 2014.
29
See 28 U.S.C. §530B, also known as the McDade Amendment.
30
Heath and McCoy, “States can discipline federal prosecutors, rarely do” available at
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2010-12-09RW_prosecutorbar09_ST_N.htm (in over two hundred cases between 1997 and 2010 in
which federal judges had found serious prosecutorial misconduct, only six federal prosecutors
were disciplined), found in LAFAVE, 6 CRIM. PROC. §24.3(a) & n.12.6.
27
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persons are not inclined to plead guilty. Indeed, they may know nothing about
the crime at all, as in cases of misidentification. However, even factually
innocent defendants will plead guilty if it reasonably appears to them that their
chance of conviction at trial, which carries a much higher sentence, is high. 31
Thus, a correct understanding of the weaknesses of the prosecution’s case is
critical to them32 so they can bargain for a reduced sentence.33
Even “factually guilty”34 defendants for whom there is exculpatory
evidence should have the opportunity to realistically gauge their chances of
conviction at trial in light of the exculpatory evidence. This is because those
defendants are still being asked to waive their constitutional rights to avoid an
enhanced post-trial sentence. At trial, due process requires that the jury hear
an adversarial presentation of the evidence to render a verdict – independent
of the prosecutor – of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.35 Plea bargaining
defendants who are acting as their own jury need that same information to
develop a defense that is independent of the prosecution’s narrative;
otherwise, they may plead guilty under the false impression that the
prosecution’s case is stronger than it really is. 36
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (allowing defendants to plead guilty while still
maintaining their innocence).
32
Lain, Accuracy supra note 21, at 29.
33
For the list of articles explaining why pre-plea discovery is necessary for fair plea
bargaining, see John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, n.17 (2001) [hereinafter Douglass, Fatal].
34
Defined as those defendants who committed the charged crimes and for whom the
prosecution apparently possesses sufficient evidence to prove the case beyond a reasonable
doubt.
35
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
36
“Because the defendant bases his choice of plea ultimately on the subjective assessment of
his chances of conviction, the state can make the bargain appear more attractive to him by
encouraging him to overestimate his chance of conviction at trial. Thus, manipulation of the
defendant's perception of his chance of conviction can create a substantial risk of incremental
inaccuracy. Procedural due process requires that defendants be given the information and
assistance necessary to make a reasonably reliable assessment of their chance of conviction at
trial.” Thomas R. McCoy & Michael J. Mirra, Plea Bargaining as Due Process in
Determining Guilt, 32 STAN. L. REV. 887, 933 (1980) [hereinafter McCoy, Plea], found in
Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist's Guide to Loss,
Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2082–83 (2000) [hereinafter Blank,
Plea]; R. Michael Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem of
Impeachment Disclosures, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1429, 1460 (2011) [hereinafter Cassidy, Plea];
also Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS
L.J. 957 (1989) [hereinafter McMunigal] (found in Cassidy, Plea).
31
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A related type of “exculpatory evidence” is evidence necessary for
litigation of dispositive pre-trial motions, such as motions to suppress
evidence because of police conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment.
Mandating early pre-plea discovery of evidence related to such claims can
help ensure that they are taken into account at the bargaining table, which in
turn can deter official misconduct.37
2. Inculpatory Evidence
The case for giving defendants exculpatory evidence is fairly intuitive, but
the reasons for giving factually guilty defendants inculpatory evidence are less
obvious.
The single best reason to mandate broad disclosure of inculpatory
evidence is to help ensure that defendants get the exculpatory evidence they
need. It’s not always easy for prosecutors to tell the difference between the
two categories. The Supreme Court’s Brady test for judging whether
exculpatory evidence was improperly withheld asks, after the trial, whether
the withheld evidence would have been “material,” meaning reasonably likely
to change the verdict or sentence in the defendant’s favor. Unfortunately, it is
impossible for prosecutors to make this determination before trial, because
they cannot predict what evidence the jury might eventually hear and they are
not privy to the defense’s case.38 The Supreme Court’s invitation for
prosecutors to err on the side of disclosure39 is not enough to save an
unworkable rule, which the Court itself has recognized as “inevitably
imprecise.”40 Furthermore, prosecutors work in an adversary system; they do
battle against the defense to obtain convictions. It takes difficult mental
gymnastics, even for scrupulous prosecutors, to believe in the defendant’s
guilt but also “put on the defense attorney’s hat” to think about how certain
evidence could help the defendant.41 All this weighs in favor of a pre-plea
discovery regime that casts a wide enough net over even apparently

See Part II(D)(2), infra, for a discussion of defendants’ rights to discovery for such motions.
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 701 (1985).
39
Id. at 699; see Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995) (advising prosecutors not to tack
too closely to the wind).
40
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976).
41
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 696–697 (Marshall dissent) (discussing how difficult it is for
prosecutors to appreciate how evidence in their own files might be helpful to the accused).
37
38
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inculpatory evidence to ensure that the requisite exculpatory evidence makes
it into the hands of the defense.42
A second reason why plea bargaining defendants need broad pre-plea
discovery has to do with the role such defendants play in the system. If judges
and juries need broad information relating to guilt and sentencing to
adequately perform their Article III functions, defendants who plead guilty –
effectively acting as their own jury and judge – should, to the extent possible,
get the same amount of information.
Of course, plea bargaining defendants may still decide to waive their right
to such information as part of a plea agreement. To prohibit such waivers,
except as to Brady material, would probably wring too much efficiency out of
plea bargaining for the system to bear. Still, such waivers could at least be
minimized with pre-plea discovery rules requiring prosecutors to provide most
discovery soon after the arraignment unless the court excused compliance on a
showing of good cause. Such waivers could also be made more intelligent by
insisting that the defense be informed of the nature of the evidence that the
prosecution would not disclose.43 And such waivers should be construed
narrowly and accepted only if also in the public interest.
There is a common objection to granting broad defense discovery of the
prosecution’s case: if factually guilty defendants know what they did, don’t
they already know the government’s case against them? The matter is not so
simple. The government’s pre-trial case against a defendant may consist of
official reports, documents, witness interviews and items of evidence. Without
access to those documents and items, the defense may not be aware of the
nature or strength of the government’s case. Although the defendant may have
a subjective recollection of events, that recollection may not be accurate (as
where the defendant was intoxicated or suffered from a mental infirmity) and
will be limited to the defendant’s personal perspective. The defendant may not

Douglass, Fatal supra note 32; see also id. (Marshall dissent).
For example, prosecutors can disclose the general nature of impeachment evidence against
a confidential informant without revealing the confidential informant’s identity. Some
scholars have argued that Brady rights should not be waivable at all, and that all Brady
evidence (including impeachment evidence) should be turned over before a guilty plea. See
Blank, Plea, supra note 35, at 2045 (describing limits to plea bargaining waivers).
42
43
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cooperate with appointed defense counsel due to fear or mistrust.44
Furthermore, crimes commonly require proof of facts that even guilty
defendants may not know, such as the actions of co-conspirators, the value of
stolen goods, an action’s effect on interstate commerce, and the presence or
purity of certain drugs.45
Defendants’ need to understand the strength of the government’s case goes
even further. Plea bargaining cannot result in similar outcomes across similar
cases unless defendants have a reasonably equal opportunity to assess their
likely chance of conviction. Two similarly situated defendants with different
amounts of information about their case will calculate their chances of
conviction differently. That difference is arbitrary to the extent that it arises
from two different prosecutors who exercise their standardless discretion over
discovery differently. 46
A third reason to inform the defense of the prosecution’s case is to make
the adversary system work.47 That system should allow the defense to prepare
to test the admissibility and strength of the prosecution’s evidence. A common
objection is that defendants know their own trial defense and are in large
measure not required to disclose it to the prosecution. Why should the
prosecution have to reveal its hand to the defense and not the other way
around? The response is, without some advance knowledge of the case, the
defense cannot adequately prepare to do this job. The government conducts
the investigation and usually has most of the trial evidence. Defense attorneys
Laura Berend, Less Reliable Preliminary Hearings and Plea Bargains in Criminal Cases in
California: Discovery Before and After Proposition 115, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 465, 531 (1998).
45
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 641 (enhanced penalties for embezzling goods worth over $1,000)
(2004), 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (mandatory minimum penalties for specified quantities and
purities of specified drugs), U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (2013).
46
For example, imagine two unrelated prosecutions. The offenses are very similar but the
prosecutors and defendants are different. In the first case, the prosecutor provides generous
discovery to the defense. In the second case, the prosecutor provides less discovery. The first
defendant’s case is strengthened by the additional discovery, because he learns of weaknesses
in the prosecution’s case and identifies additional witnesses. Therefore, he has greater
leverage at the plea-bargaining table relative to the other defendant and he gets a more
favorable plea deal. The only relevant difference between these two hypothetical defendants
and their cases is how much discovery the assigned prosecutor elected to turn over.
47
See Jean Montoya, A Theory of Compulsory Process Clause Discovery Rights, 70 IND. L.J. 845, 875
& n. 219 (1995) (discussing the place of the adversary system in constitutional law) [hereinafter
Montoya].
44
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are, in general, underfunded and under-resourced.48 In general, liberal pre-plea
discovery is necessary to let the defense put up a fair fight.49 To the extent that
the defense has asymmetrical discovery obligations, that asymmetry is rooted
in the defendant’s right against self-incrimination, a structural check itself on
executive power.
Rule 16 does a reasonably good job in the trial context of fulfilling the
foremost purpose of our criminal procedure – to get at the truth of the matter
through adversary litigation, 50 although other interests (such as privileges and
efficiency) occasionally trump. The defense needs ample discovery for there
to be a real clash of ideas leading to the truth. The Supreme Court endorsed
this notion in Wardius v. Oregon.51 There, the Court approved of an Oregon
rule requiring defendants to give notice to the prosecution of an alibi
defense.52 The Court commended the rule, although due process did not
require it, because it was “based on the proposition that the ends of justice will
best be served by a system of liberal discovery which gives both parties the
maximum possible amount of information with which to prepare their cases
and thereby reduces the possibility of surprise at trial.”53 Plea bargaining
eliminates the jury trial, but the parties’ adversarial plea negotiations perform
a similar function. Although the Supreme Court has held that there is no
general right to discovery, it has also acknowledged that due process at trial
requires a “full and fair presentation of all the relevant evidence which bears
upon the guilt of the defendant.”54
The Constitution Project, Nat'l Right to Counsel Comm., Justice Denied: America's Continuing
Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to Counsel 50 (2009), available at http://
www.constitutionproject.org/manage/file/139.pdf (last accessed on Oct. 8, 2015), found in Lauren
Sudeall Lucas, Reclaiming Equality to Reframe Indigent Defense Reform, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1197,
1267 (2013).
49
Of course this is not true in all cases. For this reason I advocate a regime of presumptive
early discovery, but the prosecution could in appropriate cases make a showing of good cause
for a court order delaying such discovery, as where it would give the defense an undue
strategic advantage or cause an undue administrative drag to prove
50
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES
(1998).
51
412 U.S. 470 (1973).
52
Id. at 473–74.
53
Id.
54
Neely v. Pennsylvania, 411 U.S. 954, 958 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of
cert.) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963) (found in Lain, Accuracy supra
note 21, at 3 & n.15.
48
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A fourth reason to allow broad pre-plea discovery is that defendants need
enough inculpatory information to understand the likely sentencing
consequences of a plea. Sentencing information, including expert reports,
scientific tests, and documentation of criminal history is often within the
prosecutor’s exclusive control. Without it, the defense may not be able to
calculate the possible sentencing consequences of a guilty plea. The
Sentencing Guidelines are rife with facts that, although not necessarily within
the defendant’s ken, make a huge difference at sentencing. 55
I now deal with three more common objections to broad pre-plea
discovery of inculpatory evidence. First, if defendants who go to trial face
substantial uncertainty regarding the strength of the government’s case, why
should plea bargaining defendants be entitled to more certainty? True,
defendants who go to trial take a substantial risk as to who will actually
testify, how those witnesses will perform, and how the jury will consider that
evidence. They likewise take their chances as to how the judge will exercise
her discretion at sentencing. And plea bargaining defendants will always face
uncertainty as they try to weigh a plea offer against their best guess as to the
likely trial outcome.56
However, this criticism assumes that jury trials are the baseline against
which plea bargaining should be measured. That assumption is wrong: given
the fact that nearly all convictions result from plea bargains (which are to
some extent coerced by the threat of a trial penalty), the new baseline is not
trial outcomes. Rather, it is bargained-for convictions.57 A key goal of
sentencing is to treat like defendants alike,58 and one way to do that is to make
sure that similarly situated defendants are protected by uniform rules of preplea discovery. The more informed they are about their cases, the more likely
they will be to bargain for similar plea deals. Unavoidable randomness in trial
See, e.g., U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(c) (drug quantity), 2B1.1(b) (fraud loss amount), 2L1.1(b)(2)
(number of aliens smuggled), 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (in jointly undertaken activity, defendant liable
for “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly
undertaken criminal activity”).
56
See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463 (2004).
57
When every customer at the car dealership gets a “discount,” nobody thinks that the full
sticker price is the true price of the car. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining
Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1138 (2011).
58
18 U.S.C. §3553(a) (2012) (there should be no “unwarranted disparities” in sentencing).
55
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outcomes does not excuse avoidable randomness in the plea process. The
public benefits from distributively just sentencing because it promotes
confidence in the system. 59
A second objection to broad pre-plea discovery is that the social cost of
providing it is too high. There are several bases for this objection: prosecutors
are wasting their time by putting together extensive disclosures for cases that
won’t be going to trial; broad discovery helps guilty defendants to
manufacture more convincing alibis; and the disclosures may give the defense
the opportunity to improperly influence or even threaten government
witnesses. Although there is little empirical data concerning the effect of
broad discovery on guilty plea rates, anecdotal evidence suggests the
following benefits of broad pre-plea discovery: it allows defendants to better
understand the strength of the government’s case against them and results in
them to plead guilty earlier in case; it reduces the need for formal discovery
motions; it eliminates disagreements over what evidence is subject to
disclosure; it reduces costs throughout the system of prolonged pre-trial
litigation over cases that ultimately result in guilty pleas; it reduces the
likelihood of wrongful convictions.60
Koon v. US, 518 US 81, 113 (1996) (guidelines should reduce unjustified disparities and so
reach toward the evenhandedness and neutrality that are the distinguishing marks of any
principled system of justice); 28 U.S.C.A. § 991 (West) (Sentencing Commission should seek
to avoid unwarranted disparities among similarly situated defendants); Wes R. Porter, The
Pendulum in Federal Sentencing Can Also Swing Toward Predictability: A Renewed Role for
Binding Plea Agreements Post-Booker, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 469, 474 (2011)
(discussing importance of evenhanded sentencing); Michael M. O'Hear, The Original Intent
of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 749, 750 (2006) (discussing
importance of uniform sentencing); Mosi Secret, Wide Sentencing Disparity Found Among
U.S. Judges, NEW YORK TIMES (March 5, 2012) (wide sentencing disparities discredit the
system) http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/nyregion/wide-sentencing-disparity-foundamong-us-judges.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0., accessed on October 6, 2014; Equal Justice
Initiative, Sentencing Bias, http://www.eji.org/raceandpoverty/sentencingbias (sentencing
disparities tend to disfavor minorities)
60
See, e.g., Voices from the Field: An Inter-Professional Approach to Managing Critical Information,
31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2037, 2074–77 (2010) (anecdotal experiences with open-file discovery policies
suggest that they make the plea bargaining process more efficient); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Foreword: New
Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: What Really Works?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV.
1943, 1951 (2010) (“Contrary to fears and expectations of individual prosecutors in his office, the
[open-file discovery] policy has enhanced effective guilty pleas and improved relationships among
counsel.”); Don DeGabrielle & Mitch Neurock, Federal Criminal Prosecutions: A View from the
Inside of the U.S. Attorney's Office, 43 DEC HOUS. LAW. 32 (2005) (modified open-file discovery
59
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A third objection is that prosecutors already have an incentive to share
inculpatory information with the defense to incentivize a guilty plea.61
Unfortunately, the prosecutor’s incentive in a guilty plea does not always
match up with the defense’s need for adequate discovery. Prosecutors do have
an enormous incentive to obtain guilty pleas in most of their cases simply
because it would be impossible to try very many of those cases. To obtain
those pleas, prosecutors routinely give over a great deal of discovery.
Nevertheless, that discovery is often insufficient to ensure that the adversary
system functions well and consistently. As stated above, prosecutors are not
always good at identifying exculpatory evidence. Although the safest way to
avoid a Brady violation is to turn over broad discovery, this approach entails
higher administrative costs and may even jeopardize witnesses. Thus,
prosecutors may elect to turn over only that information that they think
necessary to incentivize a guilty plea.62 Unfortunately, if disclosures of
exculpatory evidence are not complete, factually innocent defendants may feel
forced to plead guilty. Even if inculpatory evidence is not turned over in a
timely manner, problems at sentencing can arise. If the prosecution puts
previously undisclosed inculpatory evidence before the sentencing court in an
attempt to increase the sentence, the defendant may attempt to withdraw his
guilty plea or argue that the court should reject the plea agreement.63

policy in the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Texas results in more guilty
pleas); The Center for Prosecutorial Integrity, Roadmap for Prosecutorial Reform (White Paper), 2013,
p.11 (“prosecutors in jurisdictions with open-file discovery have found that cases can be resolved
earlier in the process because defendants can see the strength of the state’s case.”); Texas Defender
Service: Improving Discovery in Criminal Cases in Texas: How Best Practices Contribute to Greater
Justice (2013), p.1-5; Daniel S. Medwed, Brady's Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533,
1558 (2010).
61
Douglass, Fatal supra note 32, at 505–506.
62
Cf. Francis v. State, 428 S.W.3d 850, 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (prosecutor negligently
failed to disclose pre-trial the existence of a machete used in an assault. Texas Supreme Court
found that, had the defendant foregone a favorable plea bargain because it didn't know about
the machete, there might have been prejudice in the court's decision not to exclude evidence
of the machete.)
63
FED R. CRIM. P. 11(c) and (d).
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C. Structural Criteria for Criminal Procedure: Checking the Executive by
Providing Information to Article III Decision-makers
This section builds on the prior two to consider the structure of pre-plea
criminal discovery: why criminal procedure should ensure that Article III
decision-makers – the judge and jury – have sufficient information. This is
accomplished by providing adequate information to the defense, which
inherently constrains the executive. In trial-based procedure, the defense
prepares for trial based on discovery provided by the prosecution and presents
favorable information to the jury and sentencing judge, who are aided in their
task by competing prosecution and defense narratives.64 Likewise, in plea
bargaining procedure, the defendant cannot intelligently decide whether to
convict himself without adequate information upon which to formulate a
defense. In the following two sub-sections I consider the constitutional,
structural reasons for constraining prosecutorial discretion and providing
adequate information to the defense.
1. Constraining Prosecutorial Discretion
The Constitution’s structure and several of its provisions suggest the
importance of separation of powers for the criminal justice system. First,
Articles I, II, and III describe the tripartite branches: legislative, executive,
and judicial. Modern criminal procedure evinces a “street-level” version of
separation of powers: a conviction requires prosecutors (the executive branch)
to charge a violation of law (defined by the legislature) to initiate proceedings
presided over by a judge (the judicial branch).65 Thus, as explained in
Professor Rachel E. Barkow’s seminal article Separation of Powers and the
Criminal Law (cited by the Supreme Court), a concurrence of each
governmental branch is required for a conviction. 66

Of course, the need for a defense “narrative” does not shift the burden of proof; the defense
may simply explain to the jury that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt.
65
The office of federal prosecutor was created in the Judiciary Act of 1789. Private parties
have at times had authority to bring prosecutions since then but no longer do.
66
Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989,
1012–20 (2006) [hereinafter Barkow, Separation], cited in Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399,
1407 (2012).
64
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The trial jury provides a populist structural check on this concurrence of
the tripartite branches.67 Both the Sixth Amendment and Article III68 require
that a criminal conviction have the trial jury’s judgment of guilt. (Thus,
whether or not the jury is considered to be an Article III body or an extragovernmental body – or both – it must be considered as a structural
constitutional institution that checks the tri-partite branches.)69
Two opposing, yet complementary, principles underlie our separation of
powers scheme: inefficiency and efficiency. Efficiency is necessary for the
operation of government and calls for allocating power to government actors
in the criminal justice system most institutionally fit to exercise that power,
and preventing coordinate branches from intruding upon that domain. 70 For
example, the executive branch has broad discretion about what discovery to
provide to the defense. This is because the prosecution possesses the contents
of the investigation in the first place and is most familiar with it. Therefore,
efficiency seemingly dictates that the prosecution should make discovery
determinations.
Of course, this conception of efficiency is limited: the “efficient”
operation of prosecutors does not necessarily result in the socially optimal
outcome. In fact, separation of powers builds inefficiency into the system.
Separated powers assume interbranch conflict and require complicated,
deliberative procedures to respect the role of each branch and resolve such
conflicts. Notwithstanding these difficulties, this “inefficient” system is
thought to improve social outcomes. In criminal justice matters, the principle
Id. at 1015. I leave the grand jury aside in this article because pre-plea discovery is typically
a post-indictment issue. However, for defendants that plead guilty pre-indictment, the same
analysis applies: in waiving the structural protection of the grand jury, they effectively act as
their own grand jury and therefore need, all things being equal, as much information as a
grand jury would have had in making a probable cause determination.
68
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury.”).
69
Arguably, the public and press are a fifth structure, an additional check on the tri-partite
branches. The Sixth Amendment requires that the jury trial be public, and the First
Amendment provides for freedom of the press. One principle behind this seems to be
transparency in criminal justice, but I leave this structural argument for my future work. See
generally Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV.
L. REV. 2173, 2177 (2014).
70
See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756–58 (1996) (discussing principal
rationales for separation of powers).
67
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of inefficiency seeks to curb the consolidation and abuse of official power by
separating powers. For example, there cannot in theory be a conviction
without the concurrence of the tripartite branches and the jury. Of course, no
workable system of government can result from completely separated powers;
the Constitution is instead based checks and balances.71 Under checks and
balances, each branch should perform only its assigned functions, subject to
checks from the other branches.
An important corollary is that the legislature and courts should exercise
special oversight over the executive, because the executive’s duty is especially
susceptible to abuse. For example, in Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court
held that due process requires prosecutors to provide the defense with material
exculpatory evidence in time to make use of that evidence at the jury trial and
sentencing.72 Structurally, such a rule checks prosecutors by taking the
narrative out of their hands and, through the defense, empowering the jury and
judge with necessary information to arrive at a result more independent from
the prosecutor’s version of events.
Another principle of inefficiency related to separation of powers is
separation of personnel. 73 No one actor should perform the work assigned to
two or more branches (e.g., an executive officer may not perform legislative
or judicial functions).74 This curbs partiality and self-interest. This is one of
the principle ethical difficulties that prosecutors face. Their role is quasijudicial in that they must even-handedly enforce the law. Doing so requires
them to think like judges or defense attorneys, such as when they determine
what information in their possession could be exculpatory. At the same time,

M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV.
1127, 1167–68 (2000); M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of
Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 607–08 (2001).
72
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963).
73
Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or
Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1048 n.11, 1090 (1994), (found in
Steven G. Calabresi, Mark E. Berghausen & Skylar Albertson, The Rise And Fall Of The
Separation Of Powers, 106 NW U. L. REV. 527, 536 & n.48 (2012) [hereinafter Calabresi, The
Rise]).
74
Montesquieu famously argued for both separation of powers and persons. Calabresi, The
Rise, supra note 69, at 534 & n.39.
71
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their role is adversarial, in that they can’t enforce the law without pushing
back on the defense.75
Separation of powers is a useful criterion for evaluating criminal
procedure. A criminal justice system without separation of powers protections
would violate our notions of fundamental fairness, in part because the
separation of powers is baked into our constitutional order and because we are
suspicious of putting too much power in any one governmental actor or
institution.76 Although separation of powers principles alone are not sufficient
to help us to strike the right balance of power in pre-plea discovery, these
principles strongly suggest that prosecutors should not have unchecked
discretion to withhold pre-plea discovery. Judges need clear pre-plea
discovery rules that are enforceable before defendants plead guilty. This is an
important element of the balancing test discussed in Part III(C) below.
2. Informing Article III Decision-makers
A second key principle of this structural critique is that Article III
decision-makers cannot perform their functions effectively without adequate
information. A jury cannot properly adjudicate without hearing adequate
evidence through the adversary procedure. And a judge cannot preside over
the case and pronounce a just sentence without access to information that goes
beyond even what the jury hears. The structural implication of uninformed
judges and juries is clear: if they cannot properly perform their roles, they
cannot restrain executive discretion. This is important to pre-plea discovery
because defendants who plead guilty effectively act as their own judges and
juries, and they need to be properly informed in order to carry out those roles.

See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("The United States Attorney is
the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall
be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold
aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor - indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not
at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one.")
76
Separation of Powers can be viewed as a necessary component of due process, but that
doctrinal argument is beyond the scope of this paper.
75
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Of course, prosecutors in a way are acting as the judge and jury when they
use the trial penalty to pressure defendants into waiving the structural
protections of an involved judge and a trial jury. But even defendants who
plead guilty under pressure are ultimately exercising some degree of agency,
albeit a reduced one.77 To the extent that defendants have any agency in the
decision, it makes sense to refer to them as their own judge and jury and to
consider whether they have adequate information to act as such.
Juries need adequate evidence upon which to perform their Article III
function of deciding between innocence and guilt. They have no investigative
function and thus rely on the prosecution and the defense for a complete
adversarial presentation. 78 The breath of that presentation allows them to
adjudicate “on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth.”79
The sentencing judge needs even more information than the jury. 80 The
Federal Rules of Evidence place no limits on the information that a judge
considers at sentencing.81 For example, federal sentencing is a “real offense”
regime, which permits judges to look far beyond the facts of the crime of
conviction to consider all “relevant conduct” in sentencing, as well as broad

Despite the pressures that defendants face to plead guilty, the Supreme Court has generally assumed
that plea bargaining is voluntary. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978)
(“Indeed, acceptance of the basic legitimacy of plea bargaining necessarily implies rejection of any
notion that a guilty plea is involuntary in a constitutional sense simply because it is the end result of
the bargaining process.”)
78
Christopher Deal, Brady Materiality Before Trial: The Scope of the Duty to Disclose and
the Right to A Trial by Jury, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1780, 1810 (2007) [hereinafter Deal, Brady].
79
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 900–901 (1984) (in an exclusionary rule case,
recognizing goal of establishing “procedures under which criminal defendants are ‘acquitted
or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth’ ”) (quoting Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 (1969)); see also Estes v. State of Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540
(1965) (“Court proceedings are held for the solemn purpose of endeavoring to ascertain the
truth which is the sine qua non of a fair trial.”); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977)
(plurality opinion) (“[T]he sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, must satisfy the
requirements of the Due Process Clause.”)
80
See Williams v. People of State of N.Y., 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949) (“[B]oth before and
since the American colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in England practiced
a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and
types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be
imposed ….”).
81
18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2012); FED. R. EVID. 1101(d).
77
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information about the defendant’s own background and characteristics. 82
Federal judges must consider a broad variety of information at sentencing
consistent with the broad considerations inherent in sentencing. 83 Federal
probation reports must reflect this broad variety of sentencing information.84
Defendants have due process rights to receive notice of the information to be
considered,85 and also that the information received be accurate.86
Williams, 337 U.S. at 249–51; 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §
26.4(b) (3d ed. 2012) [hereinafter 5 LAFAVE, CRIMINAL]; cf. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 1B1.3 (2013).
83
18 U.S.C. §3553(a) (2012) (judges must consider the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence imposed
to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense; to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; to protect the
public from further crimes of the defendant; and to provide the defendant with needed
treatment and training).
84
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d).
85
The probation report must be disclosed to the defendant, FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e)(2). Certain
information must be excluded from the report, FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(3), but the defendant
must be given notice of such information and reasonable opportunity to comment before
sentence is pronounced. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(1)(B). cf. ABA STANDARD FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: SENTENCING, Standard §18-5.7 (3d ed. 1994), found in 5 LAFAVE, CRIMINAL supra
note 77, at §26.5(c) & n.52. Court must state reasons for sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)
(2012). “We conclude that petitioner was denied due process of law when the death sentence
was imposed, at least in part, on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny
or explain.” Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977). The Supreme Court has not made
clear whether due process or some other constitutional principle (like Eighth Amendment
protections against cruel and unusual punishment) require that the defendant receive notice of
all information used against him in sentencing. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977); 5
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL supra note 25, at §26.4(d). Defendants in capital cases have no right to
receive discovery of sentencing information in advance of sentencing. Gray v. Netherland,
518 U.S. 152 (1996). Citing to Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) – no general
right of discovery in criminal cases; in Gray, the defendant had opportunity at sentencing to
confront and cross-examine. 5 LAFAVE, CRIMINAL supra note 77, at 26.4(d).
86
In Townsend v. Burke, the defendant pleaded guilty to serious felony charges without the
benefit of counsel and received a stiff sentence based in part on “materially untrue”
information about the defendant’s criminal history. The Supreme Court found a violation of
due process. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740–41 (1948). Without properly informed
defense counsel, the adversarial process failed, and the resulting sentence was based on
misinformation. Likewise, in United States v. Tucker, the judge had enhanced the defendant’s
sentence based on two prior convictions that proved to have been unconstitutionally obtained.
404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972). Relying on Townsend, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate
court’s order that the defendant be re-sentenced without reference to the infirm convictions,
because the original sentence had been “founded at least in part upon misinformation of
constitutional magnitude.” Id. Taken together, Townsend and Tucker “stand for the general
proposition that a criminal defendant has the due process right to be sentenced on the basis of
accurate information.” Ben-Yisrayl v. Buss, 540 F.3d 542, 554 (7th Cir. 2008).
82
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Again, to the extent that plea bargains do away with jury trials and largely
determine the sentence, the structural principle of restraining the executive by
providing sufficient information to plea bargaining defendants is necessary in
designing any fair and effective pre-plea discovery regime. This is accounted
for in the balancing test discussed below in Part III(C).
In summary, prosecutors should provide the defense with broad pre-plea
discovery of both exculpatory and inculpatory evidence. If Article III
decision-makers need such information for trial, then the defendant needs it
for plea-bargaining. Moreover, federal prosecutors should not be required or
trusted to turn over all of this discovery on their own. They need to be
regulated by courts and Congress. In Part II, I argue that the Supreme Court’s
discovery cases have not recognized the structural problems in a system where
prosecutors are too powerful and plea-bargaining defendants are often underinformed.
II. A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S CRIMINAL
DISCOVERY JURISPRUDENCE
The intellectual roots of due process are intertwined with separation of
powers ideas: the state (executive) should not adjudicate and punish except by
neutral decision-makers (judge and juries) applying the settled law of the land.
This article’s structural critique highlights two key aspects of this idea. First,
such an arrangement is intended in part to curb the abuse of executive power.
Second, the decision-maker cannot render an appropriate judgment and
sentence without adequate information. That information typically reaches the
decision-maker through the adversary process, coming from both the
prosecution and the defense. I call this the due process principle of adequate
information to the decision-maker (“information principle” or “information
right”). Although this information principle is usually framed as a due process
right of defendants, the public also has a compelling interest in adequately
informed Article III decision-makers.
The Brady rule, discussed in Part II(B), infra, is consistent with these
principles. First, although it limits prosecutors’ discretion to withhold
material, exculpatory evidence, that limitation is weak because Brady
violations can only be assessed from a post-trial point of view. Second,
Brady’s rationale of providing a fair trial through the proper functioning of the
adversary system is consistent with the principle of providing adequate
information to the jury and sentencing judge. However, Brady does not extend
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to apparently inculpatory evidence that might be relevant and helpful to the
defense at trial.
The Supreme Court has decided many due process cases relating to
criminal discovery but outside of Brady’s direct progeny. Part II(C), infra,
discusses how, in many instances, those cases have done better at restraining
executive authority and providing adequate information to the decision-maker.
As shown in Part II(D), infra, due process is not the only constitutional
source of discovery rights. The Supreme Court has also considered discovery
issues under the Compulsory Process Clause.87 In fact, discovery issues have
arisen under several other trial-related Sixth Amendment rights. This Article’s
structural critique is applicable to all discovery cases, regardless of their
constitutional “hook.” In fact, the Supreme Court has sometimes paid more
attention to the structural implications of its discovery rules in its Compulsory
Process cases than in its due process cases.
Part III will demonstrate how this Part’s structural critique of cases
dealing with pre-trial discovery should be applied to pre-plea discovery.
A. Separation of Powers and Due Process
The Supreme Court’s discovery jurisprudence has been largely rooted in
due process, a concept with historical ties to separation of powers.88 Under the
Magna Carta, the king (executive) could not deprive his subjects of life,
liberty, or property without both the jury’s assent and according to the settled
law of the land and the common law.89 The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, at the time of its passage, required the same procedural protections. 90
Thus, an important meaning of due process was a series of restraints on the
executive in law enforcement: generalized law (either through the legislature
or the common law), a neutral judge, and az jury. 91

U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.”)
88
See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, XXX (1963), United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S.
622 (2002); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, XXX (1957).
89
Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process As Separation of Powers, 121
YALE L.J. 1672, 1679 (2012).
90
Id.
91
In fact, several features of due process relate to the separation of powers: fundamental
fairness in procedures, impartial decision-makers, transparency and accessibility of
government processes, and respect for separation of powers as a structural limit on
87
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Due process and separation of powers are so closely related that due
process principles can occasionally be used to decide cases that appear to raise
only separation of powers questions. For example, in Mistretta v. United
States, the Supreme Court considered whether, inter alia, the President’s
removal power of members of the United States Sentencing Commission, an
agency independent of the judicial branch, violated separation of powers.92
The Court held that separation of powers was not violated, because the
removal power did not risk violating the impartiality of the Article III judges
on the Commission. Thus, the Court invoked a due process principle (the idea
of an impartial adjudicator) to decide a separation of powers question.93
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not always acknowledged the close
relationship between due process and separation of powers.94 As several
scholars have already noted, this oversight has resulted in due process
jurisprudence that fails to adequately restrain the executive. 95 For example, in
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the Supreme Court acknowledged that broad
prosecutorial charging discretion “carries with it the potential for both
individual and institutional abuse.”96 But where prosecutors threatened to
bring charges carrying long mandatory minimum penalties for defendants who
did not plead guilty to lesser charges, the Court found no due process
violation.97 Bordenkircher stands for a narrow conception of due process that
is not offended when the executive threatens a trial penalty to incentivize and
even coerce defendants to waive a jury trial, even though that very trial is

government authority. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & TONI M. MASSARO, THE ARC OF DUE
PROCESS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 218–19 (2013) [hereinafter SULLIVAN, ARC ].
92
488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
93
Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1544
(1991) [hereinafter Brown, Separated].
94
But see Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 815–25 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (due process violated where judges promulgate rule, prosecute its
violation, and decide guilt); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522–26, 531–33 (1927) (due
process violated where mayor adjudicates prohibition violations and receives the fines from
those violations), found in Brown, Separated supra note 88, at 1556–57.
95
See Part I(A), supra.
96
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978).
97
Id. at 363.
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supposed to check the executive’s power.98 Deciding the case on separation of
powers principles would have let to a more just result.
B. The Brady rule
This section describes how the Brady rule provides defendants with
limited structural protections by forcing prosecutors to put key information in
the hands of the defense. But these protections do not go far enough, because
Brady only applies to evidence that might have changed the outcome of the
proceedings from a post-trial (as opposed to a pre-trial) perspective, and it
applies only to exculpatory evidence, not inculpatory evidence.
In Brady v. Maryland, the prosecutor failed to disclose to Brady his codefendant’s statement taking principal responsibility for a murder.99 The Court
found a due process violation.100 The rule that has emerged from Brady and
subsequent cases requires prosecutors to turn over evidence to the defense that
is “material” and exculpatory in time for its use at the jury trial.101 The
defense need not request the evidence.102 Materiality is measured from a posttrial point of view: “The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of
the proceeding would have been different,”103 meaning, the jury would not
have convicted. This same test applies to sentencing: had the judge known of
the withheld evidence, she might have imposed a more lenient sentence.104
I have already argued above that this rule gives too much discretion to
prosecutors for withholding pre-plea discovery. 105 The Brady rule’s
98
See also Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885,
1907 (2014) (describing due process as adherence to law); Barkow, Separation supra note 61.
99
373 U.S. 83, 84–85 (1963)
100
Id.
101
“Due process, it is said, requires only that disclosure of exculpatory evidence be made in
sufficient time to permit defendant to make effective use of that evidence at trial.” 6 WAYNE
R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § § 24.3(b) (3d ed. 2012) [hereinafter 6 LAFAVE,
CRIMINAL ] (citing lower court cases, no Supreme Court case law). See, e.g., United States v.
Davenport, 753 F.2d 1460, 1462 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Disclosure, to escape the Brady sanction,
must be made at a time when the disclosure would be of value to the accused.”). Although
Brady was decided under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Supreme
Court’s discovery jurisprudence has treated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as coextensive. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976).
102
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107; Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
103
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
104
Brady v. Maryland, 373 at 87.
105
See Part I(A), supra.
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unworkability is part of the problem: prosecutors are unable to accurately
gauge the post-trial materiality of evidence in cases that never go to trial. 106
And asking prosecutors to exercise in such mental gymnastics violates the
principle of separation of persons because such prosecutors have to wear three
hats – their own, the judge’s, and the defense attorney’s – to do so.107 Finally,
prosecutors might rely on the fact that judges will be reluctant to find that
withheld evidence was “material” on appeal because doing so may upset
otherwise valid convictions.108
Brady’s rationale is rooted in two interdependent purposes. The procedural
purpose is avoiding an unfair trial through the provision of exculpatory
evidence. The substantive purpose is preventing the innocent from being
convicted:109
Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair
[procedural purpose]; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any
accused is treated unfairly. . . . A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an
accused which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty
helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant [substantive purpose].110

Because Brady ultimately asks how the withheld evidence would have
affected the relevant decision-maker – the jury as to guilt or innocence, and
the judge at sentencing – it means that due process is denied if the decisionmakers are unaware of material, exculpatory evidence.
There is a structural rationale behind this due process rule. Judges and
juries make decisions based on the evidence and information before them, and
in an adversary system, the defense is responsible to present this exculpatory
information to the court. The Brady rule protects integrity of the adversary
system by enabling the defense to make that presentation.111 By considering
competing prosecution and defense narratives, judges and juries make
independent decisions about innocence, guilt, and sentencing. Thus, Brady
See Part I(C)(2), supra.
Id.
108
See John G. Douglass, Can Prosecutors Bluff? Brady v. Maryland and Plea Bargaining,
57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 589 (2007) [hereinafter Douglass, Can].
109
Brady at 87 (citing Mooney v. Holohan). See Colin Starger, Expanding Stare Decisis: The
Role of Precedent in the Unfolding Dialectic of Brady v. Maryland, 46 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 77,
127 (2013) (contrasting Brady’s substantive focus of protecting the innocent with its
procedural focus of ensuring a fair trial), found in Kreag’s article at n. 141.
110
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963).
111
Deal, Brady supra note 21, at 1809–10.
106
107
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structurally checks prosecutors by forcing them to share the power of shaping
the narrative with the defense and ultimately to empower Article III decisionmakers to arrive at a conclusion independent of the prosecution’s.112
Unfortunately, Brady’s structural protections are limited. Justice Marshall,
dissenting in Bagley, argued that Brady materiality should be determined from
a pre-trial point of view. He would have defined materiality “by reference to
the possible usefulness of the particular evidence in preparing and presenting
the case.”113 This broader reading of materiality would improve the
functioning of the adversary system by helping the defense to prepare for trial
or plea bargaining. But the Court has not been willing to extend Brady’s due
process protections to questions of pre-trial materiality,114 although I will
show below in Part II(C) that the Court has done so in other Due Process
cases outside the Brady line.
One significant exception to Brady’s post-trial materiality determination
can be found in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, which approved of a procedure
allowing trial courts to make a pre-trial determination of Brady materiality.115
In that case, Pennsylvania enacted a law protecting the confidentiality of Child
and Youth Services files unless the trial court ordered disclosure of those files.
In a prosecution of Ritchie for child abuse, the Supreme Court held that the
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 440 (1995) (found in Deal, Brady supra note 21, at 1810
& n.165. “The Court's standard also encourages the prosecutor to assume the role of the jury,
and to decide whether certain evidence will make a difference. In our system of justice, that
decision properly and wholly belongs to the jury. The prosecutor, convinced of the guilt of the
defendant and of the truthfulness of his witnesses, may all too easily view as irrelevant or
unpersuasive evidence that draws his own judgments into question. Accordingly he will
decide the evidence need not be disclosed. But the ideally neutral trier of fact, who
approaches the case from a wholly different perspective, is by the prosecutor's decision denied
the opportunity to consider the evidence.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 701 (1985)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
113
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 699 (citing examples of evidence which is helpful to the defense but
not material.). Justice Marshall proposed his own materiality test: the prosecutor should
“disclose all evidence in his files that might reasonably be considered favorable to the
defendant's case.” Id. at 702.
114
6 LAFAVE, CRIMINAL supra note 77, at § 24.3(b) citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,
100 & n. 20 (1995) accord Weatherford v Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977). 6 LAFAVE, CRIMINAL
supra note 77, at § 24.3(b). For scholarly commentary, see Brian D. Ginsberg, Always Be
Disclosing: The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Divulge Inadmissible Evidence, 110
W.VA.L.REV. 611 (2008), found in 6 LAFAVE, CRIMINAL supra note 77, at § 24.3(b) & n.
45.1.
115
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
112
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trial court should have examined Child and Youth Services files in camera for
Brady material and turned those materials over to defendant. Ritchie presents
a solution to the structural problem of prosecutors unilaterally choosing to
withhold discovery. In practice, where federal prosecutors face a close call
over whether evidence is material and exculpatory and they decide not to turn
it over, they frequently submit it to the trial judge for in camera review,
seeking a finding that the evidence is not material or exculpatory.116
In contrast to Brady’s rule regarding exculpatory evidence, the Supreme
Court has refused to find a due process right to inculpatory evidence. In
Weatherford v. Bursey, Weatherford and Bursey committed a crime together,
but Bursey didn’t realize that Weatherford was a police operative.117
Weatherford testified against Bursey at the bench trial and Bursey was
convicted. Bursey never knew that Weatherford would be a prosecution
witness. The Supreme Court held that, because there was “no general
constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case,” the prosecution’s failure
to reveal the identity of this key inculpatory witness did not violate Brady.118
The fact that Bursey might have opted for a plea bargain had he known in
advance of Weatherford’s testimony was likewise immaterial, because there
was “no constitutional right to plea bargain.”119
Thus, the Court’s due process jurisprudence has not conferred a general
right to discovery of inculpatory evidence.120 This limitation is unwise for two
structural reasons. First, prosecutors have too much unregulated discretion not
to turn over discovery that is relevant to the preparation of the defense.
Second, if the defense is unprepared, both the judge and the jury may be
deprived of an effective adversarial presentation necessary for proper
adjudication of guilt and sentencing.
C. Other Right to Information Cases Arising under Due Process
This section considers other due process cases outside the Brady line that
articulate a more robust pre-trial (and potentially pre-plea) conception of the
right to information.

116
Such orders are believed to insulate prosecutors from bar disciplinary proceedings and, to
some extent, from appellate findings of an unintentional Brady violation.
117
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977).
118
Id. at 559.
119
Id. at 560.
120
See Part III(B), infra (discussing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002))
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1. Executive duty to preserve evidence for fact-finder’s benefit –
California v. Trombetta
The Supreme Court has upheld the principle of providing broad
information to the defense – even beyond that which is material and
exculpatory – in its due process jurisprudence about the duty to preserve
evidence. In California v. Trombetta, the Court held that law enforcement
agencies, acting in good faith and according to established policies, did not
need to preserve breath samples in driving under the influence of alcohol
investigations in order for their analysis of those samples to be admissible.
However, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the state in its investigation
had a duty to preserve evidence that “might be expected to play a significant
role in the suspect's defense.”121
The Trombetta court placed its holding within a “group of constitutional
privileges,” including Brady, that give defendants access to exculpatory
evidence.122 However, Trombetta should in theory give the defense broader
access to information than Brady. Because Trombetta concerned
investigations before criminal proceedings were instituted, the Court
articulated a materiality standard based on evidence’s potential value to the
defense at the time the evidence could be preserved. That is, in contrast to
Brady’s post-trial materiality standard, Trombetta tests materiality at the time
of the investigation, typically before charges are filed.
True, Trombetta is deferential to the executive’s good faith decisions,
which may limit its actual benefit to defendants.123 However, Trombetta also
strengthens the due process right “that criminal defendants be afforded a
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense”124 because it requires
the executive to preserve evidence that is not necessarily exculpatory but only
“potentially exculpatory.”125 The executive is not left guessing as to the
ultimate materiality of any evidence but instead asks the more immediately
relevant question of whether it “might be expected to play a significant role in

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488 (1984).
Id. at 485
123
The Court strengthened the good faith requirement in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51
(1988).
124
Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485
125
Id. at 481.
121
122
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the suspect's defense.”126 More information is likely to flow to the defense
under this rule. This checks the executive by helping defendants to investigate
and prepare their defense, ultimately resulting in more information and a
richer competing narrative for the judge and jury. 127
2. Right to “raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense” –
Ake v. Oklahoma
In Ake v. Oklahoma, an indigent defendant was tried on capital charges.128
The judge rejected Ake’s pre-trial request for a court-appointed psychologist,
and the jury subsequently rejected Ake’s bare-bones insanity defense.
Applying the due process balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge,129
the Supreme Court found a due process violation.130 Indigent defendants were
entitled to “equal justice,”131 and the adversary system could not function
properly if the defendant lacked “access to the raw materials integral to the
building of an effective defense.”132 In this way, the appointment of the
psychologist would have been a safeguard to “diminish the risk of erroneous
convictions.”133
Significantly, discovery relating to the court-appointed psychologist might
have ultimately proved fatal to the defense, but as in Trombetta, the concern
was with giving the defense access to potentially exculpatory evidence,
judged from a pre-trial perspective. The more complete the prosecution
disclosures, the better the springboard for the defense’s independent
investigation. Ake teaches that the adversary system functions better if the
126
Id. at 488–89 (1984) (potentially exculpatory evidence “must both possess an exculpatory
value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the
defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available
means”).
127
In reasoning that echoes Trombetta, some courts have also imposed a limited due processbased duty on prosecutors to create evidence in the form of a pre-trial lineup that could
potentially exculpate the accused. United States v. Estremera, 531 F.2d 1103, 1111 (2d
Cir.1976). There is no constitutional right for the prosecution to arrange such a lineup. People
v. Mena, 277 P.3d 160 (Cal. 2012) (collecting cases). However, some lower courts have held
that the trial judge has discretion to grant one “if the request is made promptly after the crime
or arrest” and the lineup “may be of value to both sides.” Estremera, 531 F2d. at 1111.
128
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
129
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976); see Part III(A), infra.
130
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74
131
Id. at 76.
132
Id. at 77.
133
Id. at 78.
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defense receives information well in advance of trial that reasonably appears
to be necessary for the effective preparation of the defense.134
3. Right to information “relevant and helpful to the defense” – Roviaro v.
United States
In Roviaro v. United States,135 which preceded Brady v. Maryland,
Roviaro was tried and convicted on drug charges. A confidential informant
had been central to the criminal transaction, and Roviaro sought for the
government to disclose the informant’s true identity. The government asserted
that the information was privileged, and the judge denied the motion. The
Supreme Court reversed the conviction and supplied a broad standard to guide
the trial court’s exercise of discretion to order discovery related to an
informant. This standard was rooted in fundamental fairness, mandating
disclosure “[w]here the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents
of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or
is essential to a fair determination of a cause.”136 The trial court should
balance the public’s interest in preserving the privilege against the defendant’s
interest in the evidence. 137
The Roviaro standard of materiality is broader than Brady’s and should
result in more information to judges and juries in informant cases. First, the
required balancing is conducted from a pre-trial perspective.138 Second, unlike
the Brady rule, which is only concerned with evidence, the requested
discovery here was information that might or might not have led to evidence,
and that evidence might or might not have been exculpatory. Third, Roviaro’s
broad conception of the potential materiality of an informant’s testimony “to a

Justices BURGER (concurring) and RHENQUIST (dissenting) would have limited Ake’s
holding to capital cases. At 87.
135
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957)
136
Id. at 60–61 (1957). Roviaro relies on “fundamental fairness” without mentioning due
process. The Supreme Court later clarified that its holding in Roviaro was based on the
court’s supervisory power. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), found in 6 LAFAVE,
CRIMINAL supra note 85, at § 24.3(g). Later, in California v. Trombetta, the Court categorized
Roviaro as a case concerning “constitutional privileges” alongside other due process-based
access-to-evidence cases. 467 U.S. at 485.
137
Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62.
138
Id. at 65 & n. 15.
134
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fair determination of a cause”139 focuses on the importance of getting
sufficient information to the trier of fact through the adversary system.
D. Right to Information Cases Not Arising out of Due Process
1.
Compulsory Process for the Effective Functioning of the Courts and
United States v. Nixon
The Supreme Court has held that several Sixth Amendment rights relate to
due process, including “the right to offer the testimony of witnesses” and
compulsory process.140 Taken together, they comprise “the right to present a
defense,”141 which is “a fundamental element of due process of law.”142 But,
logically, the right to present a defense would be meaningless if there were no
associated right to prepare a defense. Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall
acknowledged as far back as United States v. Burr (1806) that compulsory
process should provide the accused, before the trial, 143 with documents that
were “really essential to his defense”144
In United States v. Nixon (1974), a criminal discovery case arising
primarily under the Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory Process Clause, the
Supreme Court employed a separation of powers analysis that depended on
the due process principle of adequate information to the decision-maker.145
The Watergate special prosecutor had sought to subpoena materials from the
President of the United States under Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.146 The materials sought were recordings of conversations between
President Nixon and the Watergate defendants, and they were expected to
provide key evidence. Although Nixon concerned discovery for the

Id. at 61.
Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972) (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19
(1967)), found in James F. Ponsoldt, Balancing Government Efficiency and the Protection of
Individual Liberties: An Analysis of the Conflict Between Executive Branch "Housekeeping"
Regulations and Criminal Defendants' Rights to A Constitutionally Fair Trial, 19 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349, 379 & n.123 (1984).
141
Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. at 98.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 33. Found in Montoya, supra note 95, at 869.
144
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 1, 35, 37 (C.C.D. Ky. 1806).
145
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974).
146
Although a Rule 17 subpoena is not technically a discovery device, Id. at 698, it permits to
obtain evidence from third parties.
139
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prosecutor, its reasoning was broad enough to encompass discovery from the
prosecutor, too.147
The President tried to quash the subpoena, asserting a separation of
powers argument for a strong executive privilege. The Supreme Court rejected
that strict separation of powers argument in favor of checks and balances. It
held that an unqualified presidential privilege in these circumstances would
“plainly conflict with the function of the courts under Article III”148 and
interfere with the Constitution’s clear intent that the “dispersed powers”
(tripartite branches), though separate in their assigned functions, be integrated
into a “workable government.”149
Turning to due process principles, the Court found that the President’s
privilege needed to be weighed against “the rule of law” and the “need to
develop all relevant facts in the adversary system.”150 The Court’s analysis
depended on the due process principle of adequate information to the
decision-maker through the adversary process:
The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a
partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system
and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the
framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the
function of courts that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence
needed either by the prosecution or by the defense.151

The Court also emphasized that the subpoenaed materials were needed before
the trial for “examination and processing” by the special prosecutor.152
Although Nixon addressed Compulsory Process in the pre-trial context, the
same principles of access to information could well be applied to pre-plea
criminal discovery. In fact, the Nixon court specifically stated that “the right to
the production of all evidence at a criminal trial” implicated not only the
Id. at 709.
Id. at 707.
149
Id. (quoting Youngstown, Jackson concurrence). Cite generally to Brown, Separated supra
note 77, at 1562–63.
150
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708.
151
Id. at 709. See also Brown, Separated supra note 77, at 1564 (“Recognition of an absolute
privilege residing in article II would have had tremendous potential to affect important
individual rights. It would have amounted to the Judiciary's acquiescing in a criminal system
which allowed one governmental department both to prosecute a defendant and to control his
defense. That appears to be just the type of consolidation of power that the system of
separated powers was intended to thwart.”)
152
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 702. Found in Montoya, supra note 95, 868–69.
147
148
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Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses but also the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.153 Due process and separation of powers
were inextricably intertwined, because an excessively strong executive
privilege that withheld “demonstrably relevant” evidence “would cut deeply
into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function
of the courts.”154
The Court invoked an “ancient proposition” in favor of expansive
compulsory process-based discovery: “ ‘the public . . . has a right to every
man's evidence,’ except for those persons protected by a constitutional,
common-law, or statutory privilege. . . ”155 Although the Court has not used
such expansive language in the discovery context, it has applied this same
principle to grand jury subpoenas and congressional subpoenas.156 Such an
expansive discovery principle calls not for exculpatory evidence but for
“relevant” evidence for the parties to use in the trial preparations.
In another case, the Supreme Court relied on both compulsory process and
due process to uphold the principle that the jury cannot perform its truthseeking function without a robust defense right to present evidence. In Webb
v. Texas, the Supreme Court held that due process was denied where the trial
judge effectively dissuaded a defense witness from testifying. 157 This also
violated the right to present a defense through compulsory process: “The right
to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if
necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present
the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it
may decide where the truth lies.”158
This compulsory process right to prepare a defense is designed to check
the prosecution by not letting it control the defense case.159 The right must
attach before the trial because the defendant cannot always know that a

Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711.
Id. at 712.
155
Id. at 709.
156
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (same principle applied to grand jury
subpoenas); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323(1950) (same principle applied to
congressional subpoenas).
157
Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972).
158
Id. at 98, citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
159
Montoya, supra note 95, at 863–64; Brown, Separated supra note 77, at 1564.
153
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witness is “in his favor” without some pre-trial discovery. 160 Both the
Compulsory Process Clause and the Due Process Clauses can be applied to
criminal discovery. 161 One scholar has proposed a theory under which due
process should decide some kinds of discovery cases and compulsory process
should decide other kinds. 162 For the purposes of this article, though, it is
enough to say that my structural critique extends to discovery cases arising
under due process or Compulsory Process or, as in Nixon, both.
2. Other Potential Constitutional Sources of Discovery Rights
There may be other clauses in the Constitution that could serve as the
basis for broader discovery rights. For example, the Sixth Amendment right to
assistance of counsel includes the right to be advised of “the advantages and
disadvantages of a plea agreement.”163 However, without adequate discovery,
defense counsel can’t always adequately investigate the case to evaluate
potential plea agreements.164 Thus, some scholars have argued that pre-plea
discovery is necessary to effectuate defense counsel’s Sixth Amendment duty
to investigate and provide competent advice.165 They have even argued that
this defense duty may be impossible to effectively carry out with a
corresponding prosecution duty to provide broad discovery. 166
The accused also has a Sixth Amendment right “to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation.”167 Rooted in that clause, the bill of
particulars has in times past been used as a discovery device. Although the bill
of particulars could serve as a vehicle for court-ordered pre-plea discovery, it
160
Montoya, supra note 95, at 867. Cf. Powell v Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (defense
counsel cannot be effective at trial without the opportunity to prepare for trial) (Found in
Montoya, supra note 95, at 868).
161
For example, in Ritchie, the Supreme Court applied Due Process to a discovery issue but
could just as well have analyzed the problem under Compulsory Process. See Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987) (found in Montoya, supra note 95, at 872–73.)
162
See Montoya, supra note 95, at 873–78.
163
Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50–51 (1995).
164
Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to
Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1103
(2004); see also Lain, Accuracy supra note 42, at 17.
165
Russell D. Covey, Plea-Bargaining Law After Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 595, 611–
12 (2013) [hereinafter Covey].
166
Id.
167
See U.S. Const. amend. VI. “[T]he Constitution does not address criminal discovery
rights.” John G. Douglass, Balancing Hearsay and Criminal Discovery, 68 FORDHAM L. REV.
2097, 2176 & n. 333 (2000).
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has fallen out of favor.168 Likewise, the Supreme Court has interpreted the due
process notice requirement to refer only to notice of the charge itself and not
the evidentiary support for that charge.169
The Sixth Amendment right to confront government witnesses arguably
cannot be effective without sufficient discovery. However, the Supreme Court
has refused to recognize a right of discovery within the Confrontation Clause,
holding instead that confrontation is strictly a trial right.170
Finally, pre-trial suppression motions can be case-dispositive even in the
plea-bargaining stage. The constitutional requirements for discovery relating
to such claims are unclear. The Supreme Court has recognized a court’s power
to order the production of discovery relevant to an Equal Protection claim. 171
This power arises under the Equal Protection component of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, although it is not clear whether such a
claim can result in the suppression of evidence. 172 Of course, the most
common basis for pre-trial suppression motions is the Fourth Amendment. An
argument could be made that the Fourth Amendment contains a “hidden”
discovery requirement, rooted in due process, requiring the provision of
evidence necessary for the defense preparation of a suppression motion.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court is unlikely to apply Brady to pre-trial
suppression motions because Brady’s substantive concern is with accurately
sorting the guilty from the innocent, not ferreting out law enforcement’s
constitutional violations.
In summary, the information principle, rooted in both separation of powers
and due process, holds that the executive must be restrained through the
provision of information to the defense which allows for the adversary system
to properly function. Unfortunately, the Brady rule embodies the information
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(f): “The court may direct the government to file a bill of
particulars.” See also United States v. Smith, 16 F.R.D. 372, 374–75 (W.D. Mo. 1954) (bill of
particulars may be necessary to preparation of the defense).
169
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 & n.20 (1976); cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 564 (1974) (“We hold that written notice of the charges must be given to the
disciplinary-action defendant in order to inform him of the charges and to enable him to
marshal the facts and prepare a defense.”)
170
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 68 (1987) (BLACKMUN, J. concurring).
171
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
172
See, e.g., United States v. Cousin, 448 F. App'x 593, 594 (6th Cir. 2012) (suppression not a
remedy for Equal Protection violation).
168
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principle in only a limited way, because Brady does not cover inculpatory
evidence and is only enforceable post-trial. But the Supreme Court has given
strong expression to this principle throughout its Due Process and Compulsory
Process jurisprudence. In Part III, I examine how this principle can be adapted
to pre-plea discovery.
III. ADAPTING DUE PROCESS TO PRE-PLEA DISCOVERY
Part II’s structural critique of the right to information cases is helpful in
understanding how pre-plea discovery ought to work. Because the criminal
justice system is based principally upon plea bargaining instead of jury trials,
the task is to adapt constitutional guarantees to plea bargaining procedure.173
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has been slow to do this. 174 (Although there
is a venerable tradition of scholarly jeremiads calling for its abolition, 175 there
is no reason to think that plea bargaining is going away. Thus, it is sensible, if
a little disappointing, to consider ways to regulate the practice.) Still, there is a
good opportunity to do so for pre-plea discovery because the Supreme Court’s
right to information cases are principally grounded in due process. Modern
due process jurisprudence has shown itself to be flexible enough to meet the
demands of a variety of situations.
Part IV(A) discusses the evolution of the test for criminal due process
from one based on historical practice to one based on a fact-specific balancing
of interests. Part IV(B) shows how the Supreme Court wrongly applied the
due process balancing test in its most significant case about pre-plea
discovery, United States v. Ruiz. Finally, in Part IV(C), I propose my own due
process balancing test for pre-plea discovery based on Part II’s structural
critique.

Stephanos Bibas, Regulating The Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor To
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1138 (2011).
174
The Supreme Court has generally been more willing to apply due process protections to
trials than to pre-trial procedures. See Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process,
25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2006) (cited in SULLIVAN, ARC supra note 76, at 91.) The first
major Supreme Court case upholding plea bargaining was Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742 (1970), although plea bargaining had already long been in use. GEORGE FISHER, PLEA
BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 175–80 (2003)
[hereinafter Fisher].
175
See, e.g., Schulhoffer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, supra note 7; Alschuler,
The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, supra note 7.
173
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A. Due Process Evolving
Although the core purpose of due process has always been to make fair
and accurate adjudicatory decisions, 176 the Supreme Court has used different
tests over time for determining whether a particular feature of criminal
procedure comported with due process. An important early case is Murray’s
Lessee (1855), involving the federal government’s use of a non-judicial
warrant to recover embezzled funds.177 The Supreme Court decided what
constituted due process in that case by reference to the common law and
accepted practices at the time of the Fifth Amendment’s passage.178 In other
words, the Court used history as its guide.
A later case, Hurtado v. California (1884), took a markedly different
approach in assessing a state’s procedural innovation.179 The Supreme Court
held that California had not violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause by allowing prosecutors in felony cases to dispense with the
grand jury indictment and to proceed instead by way of a judicial probable
cause determination. The Hurtado court took a different view of the common
law than Murray’s Lessee: “[I]t was the characteristic principle of the
common law to draw its inspiration from every fountain of justice, [and] we
are not to assume that the sources of its supply have been exhausted.”180 Even
if California’s procedure did not comport with the common law, as long as the
procedure was consistent with “fundamental principles of liberty and justice,”
due process was satisfied.181 The new procedure must be non-arbitrary and
substantially equivalent to the common law procedure in its protections
afforded to defendants.182
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly so held, it appears that
the due process cases upholding the constitutionality of plea bargaining like
Bordenkircher v. Hayes183 have implicitly drawn on the reasoning of Hurtado.
In Hurtado, the California replaced the grand jury – a venerable, extragovernmental check on prosecutorial power – with a preliminary hearing
SULLIVAN, ARC supra note 76, at 88.
Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvment Co., 59 U.S. 272, 275 (1855).
178
Murray, 59 U.S. at 280; SULLIVAN, ARC supra note 76, at 82–83.
179
110 U.S. 516 (1884).
180
Id. at 531.
181
Id. at 535; SULLIVAN, ARC supra note 76, at 84.
182
Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538; SULLIVAN, ARC supra note 76, at 84 (or thereabouts).
183
See Part II(A), supra.
176
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before a judge. The Supreme Court found that hearing to be a constitutionally
adequate alternative to a grand jury indictment. Likewise, even though
Bordenkircher also weakens structural protections, giving prosecutors too
much power at the expense of other criminal justice actors by placing
enormous pressure on defendants to waive their constitutional right to a jury
trial, the Court found no due process violation. This holding can best be
understood as viewing plea bargaining as “a constitutionally adequate
alternative procedure for the determination of guilt.”184
Modern due process cases have drawn on either the historical analysis of
Murray’s Lessee or the more pragmatic approach of Hurtado.185 The
landmark test announced in Matthews v. Eldridge (1976) expanded the
Hurtado approach by considering the merits of a particular procedure without
reference to history.186 There, the Supreme Court considered the process due
in a civil case and articulated a balancing test187 that was subsequently adapted
to criminal cases such as Ake v. Oklahoma (1985).188
The balancing test first considered “the private interest that will be
affected by the action of the State.”189 Because defendants have a risk of being
deprived of life, liberty, or property, they have “an almost uniquely
compelling interest” in procedures that “diminish the risk of erroneous
conviction.”190 The second factor is “the governmental interest that will be
affected if the safeguard is to be provided.”191 The Court made clear that the

184
McCoy, Plea supra note 51. (assessing plea bargaining practice in light of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine), found in Blank, Plea supra note 51, at 2082.
185
Of course, the difference between the two approaches need not be so stark. See, e.g.,
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20–21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment) (“The
concept of due process is, “perhaps, the least frozen concept of our law—the least confined to
history and the most absorptive of powerful social standards of a progressive society. But
neither the unfolding content of ‘due process' nor the particularized safeguards of the Bill of
Rights disregard procedural ways that reflect a national historic policy.”)
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992)
186
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976).
187
Id. at 334–335.
188
Ake v. Oklahoma , 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985). Described above in Part II(C)(2). The Supreme
Court used the same balancing test in United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002), discussed
below in Part III(C), infra.
189
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. at 77 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335).
190
Id.
191
Id. at 77 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335).
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state had an “interest in the fair and accurate adjudication of criminal cases”192
and downplayed the costs involved to the state in paying for the services of a
single medical expert.193 The third factor was “the probable value of the
additional or substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards are not
provided.”194
In Medina v. California (1992), the Supreme Court considered whether a
state criminal procedural rule violated due process.195 The Court,
distinguishing Ake,196 held that the Mathews balancing test was inappropriate
for evaluating state criminal procedural rules. 197 The Court reasoned that the
states had substantial expertise, through common law experience, in designing
criminal procedures, and their considered judgments in that regard should not
be proscribed by the Due Process Clause unless “it offend[ed] some principle
of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental.”198 Fundamental fairness could be gauged by
historical practice.199 Where history was not conclusive, the Court would ask
simply whether the state rule ran afoul of “any recognized principle of
‘fundamental fairness,’”200 defined narrowly. 201 The Court has never
definitively decided whether it will apply the deferential Medina v. California
test or the Mathews v. Eldridge (Ake v. Oklahoma) test to criminal due process
cases. 202

Id. at 78–79. The Mathews test has been criticized for not considering fairness. SULLIVAN,
ARC supra note 76, at 94.
193
Id. at 79–80.
194
Id. at 77 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335).
195
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
196
The concurrence was not persuaded by the majority’s attempt to distinguish Ake. Medina
v. California, 505 U.S.at 453 (O’CONNOR, J., concurring); SULLIVAN, ARC supra note 76, at
97–98.
197
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. at 443.
198
Id. at 445, quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201–202 (1977).
199
Id. at 446.
200
Id. at 448, quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990).
201
Id. at 443, citing Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. at 352. See also Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952) (“We may not draw on our merely personal and private notions and
disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial function.”)
202
Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1101 (2014) (declining to decide that very
question).
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B. The Rigid Due Process of United States v. Ruiz
In United States v. Ruiz (2002), Angela Ruiz had been arrested carrying
thirty kilograms of marijuana in her luggage. The prosecution offered her a
reduced sentence in exchange for a plea agreement that would have
guaranteed discovery of “any [known] information establishing the factual
innocence” but required Ruiz to waive any right to discovery of witness
impeachment information.203 Ruiz rejected the plea agreement, pleaded guilty,
and sought the benefit of the rejected plea agreement at sentencing. The
Supreme Court held that due process did not require the government to turn
over impeachment evidence before the guilty plea.204
The Ruiz court reasoned that a constitutional guilty plea waiver required
only a general “awareness of relevant circumstances” and not a “complete
knowledge” of those circumstances. 205 Although the Court conceded that
well-informed pleas are “wiser,” a plea was “voluntary” if made knowingly,
intelligently, and with sufficient awareness of the general consequences of the
plea. 206 Such awareness need not include the specific circumstances of the
plea such as the strength of the prosecution’s case or likelihood of conviction
at trial. 207 This holding was in line with Supreme Court precedent judging
waivers as “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege.”208
In Brady v. United States (1970), the Supreme Court arguably took a
slightly broader view of whether a waiver was truly knowing and
intelligent.209 The Court in Brady v. United States (not to be confused with
536 U.S. at 625.
Id.
205
Id. at 630.
206
Id. at 629–30.
207
Id.; see also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969).
208
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (“A defendant who enters such a
plea simultaneously waives several constitutional rights, including his privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront his accusers.
For this waiver to be valid under the Due Process Clause, it must be ‘an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464, (1938). Consequently, if a defendant's guilty plea is not equally voluntary and
knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void. Moreover,
because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot
be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to
the facts.”)
209
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
203
204
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Brady v. Maryland) held that a guilty plea could still be voluntary even if
entered into to avoid the death penalty. Although a knowing waiver required
only “sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences,”210 the Court highlighted the desirability of the defendant, with
the assistance of counsel, making “an intelligent assessment of the relative
advantages of pleading guilty”211 and “rationally weigh[ing] the advantages of
going to trial against the advantages of pleading guilty.”212 This implies that
defendants without adequate knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of
the prosecution’s case might not be “knowingly” pleading guilty. Several
commentators have argued that a guilty plea is not knowing and voluntary if
the defendant lacks knowledge of material exculpatory evidence.213 The lower
courts, both before and after Ruiz, have struggled with the issue whether a
generalized pre-plea Brady duty exists.214 Some lower courts have held that a
prosecutor’s failure to disclose evidence could negate the knowingness and
voluntariness of a guilty plea.215
The central problem with Ruiz is that it ignores Brady v. Maryland’s
fairness rationale: due process is violated where the defense lacks access to
exculpatory evidence because the resulting trial would be unfair. For example,
Id. at 748.
Id. at 748, n.6.
212
Id. at 750.
213
McMunigal, supra note 52, at 964, found in Michael Nasser Petegorsky, Plea Bargaining
in the Dark: The Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Brady Evidence During Plea Bargaining, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 3599, 3612 & n. 125 (2013).) [hereinafter Peteporsky]. Some have gone so
far as to argue that a waiver of the right to Brady material cannot be knowing and intelligent
because the information is material to guilt or innocence and the defendant does not know
what he does not know. See Erica G. Franklin, Waiving Prosecutorial Disclosure in the Guilty
Plea Process: A Debate on the Merits of “Discovery” Waivers, 51 STAN. L.REV. 567, 581
(1999), found in United States v. Ruiz, 241 F.3d 1157, 1164 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2001) rev'd, 536
U.S. 622 (2002).
214
See Douglass, Fatal supra note 49, at 440 & n.11 (pre-Ruiz). For cases after Ruiz,
Compare United States v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 2009) (refusing to extend Ruiz
to Brady) with McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787–88 (7th Cir. 2003) (extending Ruiz
to Brady), found in Podger, Pleading supra note 45, at 1643 & n. 66 (2011). For a discussion
of how Lafler and Frye might shed light on lower courts’ dilemma, see Covey, supra note
159, at 600–602.
215
Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 291 (1st Cir. 2006) (“Under limited circumstances,
however-everything depends on context-the prosecution's failure to disclose evidence may be
sufficiently outrageous to constitute the sort of impermissible conduct that is needed to
ground a challenge to the validity of a guilty plea. [citations omitted]”).
210
211
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the Ruiz court concluded that defendants who plead guilty voluntarily, even if
the government fails to disclose impeachment information to them, are in fact
guilty. 216 The Supreme Court made a similar assumption in Brady v. United
States and other cases.217 But there is a real danger that factually innocent
defendants will rationally choose to plead guilty based on the perceived
strength of the government’s case. One antidote is a right, enforceable before
the guilty plea, to all material, exculpatory evidence.
Another shortcoming of Ruiz is that it declines to hold that plea bargaining
implicates not just innocence and guilt, but also sentencing. In fact, even
though plea bargaining collapses adjudication and sentencing in most cases,218
the Supreme Court has never held that defendants have a right to understand
the sentencing consequences of their pleas.219 Instead, if the defendant is
factually guilty, then any sentencing consequences of which he was not aware
at the time of the guilty plea are simply irrelevant to the validity of that
plea.220 Although there is a range of mutually beneficial sentencing outcomes
to any guilty plea,221 defendants need sufficient information to assess the
likely sentencing consequences that they face.
The Ruiz court formulated a bright-line rule that would not slow down the
machinery of plea bargaining. Previously, the Court had held that
impeachment evidence should be evaluated for materiality just the same as

United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629–630.
The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose to Defendants Pleading Guilty, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1004,
1009 (1986) (“The [Brady] opinion seems to reflect a belief that all guilty pleas that meet the
voluntary and intelligent standard are honest and truthful confessions and are not affected by
factors independent of the defendant's guilt or innocence—in other words, that such pleas are
accurate.”). See also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 263–64 (1973), found in CASSIDY,
PROSECUTORIAL supra note 42, at 88.
218
Robert M. Sussman, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286 (1972), Stephanos
Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, 126 HARV. L. REV. 150, 171
(2012) (“Charging is now convicting, which is sentencing. Plea bargaining itself has
undermined these checks and balances, and judges need to use their remedial powers to
restore some semblance of balance, however imperfect.”)
219
See, e.g., Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court's Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining: The
Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 588 (2014) (“Thus far, the Court
has not taken an expansive view in defining ‘intelligent.’”).
220
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629.
221
See Lain, Accuracy supra note 42, at 25.
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any other form of exculpatory evidence.222 This rule required laborious, caseby-case consideration, but for good reason: impeachment evidence can be the
most powerful Brady material of all, as when a police officer’s or a
confidential informant’s history of dishonesty casts his version of events in an
entirely different light. But the Ruiz Court changed course, holding that
impeachment information need not be disclosed, because it helped defendants
in only “random” ways. 223
The Ruiz court, drawing on Ake and Eldridge, balanced the following
considerations: “(1) the nature of the private interest. . . (2) the value of the
additional safeguard, and (3) the adverse impact of the requirement upon the
Government’s interests.”224 As for the first factor, the Court decided that
discovery of impeachment evidence was of only limited use to defendants,
especially where they were not waiving the right to receive discovery showing
their factual innocence of the crime.225 As for the second factor, the Court
concluded with little analysis that the proposed rule would not decrease the
chance of innocent people pleading guilty. 226 The third factor prevailed,
because the proposed rule could seriously interfere with the efficient
administration of justice.227
Ironically, although Ruiz employed a modern due process balancing test,
the Court did not account for the fact that Brady, if not adapted to plea
bargaining, is a dead letter for the 97% of federal defendants who plead guilty.
In other contexts, particularly ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court has
recognized the new legal landscape and extended trial-based rights to plea
bargaining.228 Given the kinship between due process and separation of
powers, I argue that separation of powers principles should have informed the
application of the balancing test in Ruiz. In the next section, I explain how the
balancing test should be adapted to pre-plea discovery.
473 U.S. at 676. Found in CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL supra note 42, at p. 69 & n.15. 5.3.
See also Napue v. People of State of Ill., 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (witness credibility can
determine the outcome of trial)
223
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630.
224
Id. at 631 (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. at 77)
225
Id. at 631.
226
Id.
227
Id.
228
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010); Lafler v.
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
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C. A Due Process Balancing Test Adapted to Pre-Plea Discovery
This section considers how to determine whether a defendant has received
due process in pre-plea discovery. The Eldridge/Ake balancing test is the best
jumping-off point because it provides the most flexibility in responding to
modern legal problems. In Eldridge, the Supreme Court considered what
process was due in denying social security benefits. This was a modern,
administrative law question that was not amenable to resolution by historical
inquiry.229 Likewise, the problem of pre-plea discovery is a modern concern.
Although plea bargaining has existed in some forms since the Founding Era, it
did not largely supplant the jury trial until the twentieth century. 230 Like the
social security question in Eldridge, pre-plea discovery cannot be productively
analyzed solely by reference to past practices but is instead a modern
phenomenon calling for a modern test.231 Just as the Mathews test has yielded
some hard baseline rules in the civil context (such as notice in a meaningful
time and manner),232 my modified Mathews test helps establish hard baseline
rule for pre-plea disclosures.
Of course, as I have already argued, providing due process in plea
bargaining requires sensitivity to structural considerations of restraining
executive discretion to put adequate information into the hands of plea
bargaining defendants, who in large measure convict and sentence themselves.
Thus, for pre-plea discovery, I would modify the Ake/Eldridge test to balance
the interests of criminal defendants and society. First, to gauge the defendant’s
interests, one should ask whether, from a pre-trial perspective, the undisclosed
material at issue is likely to play a significant role in the preparation of the
defense for plea bargaining. This includes the related aims of accurately
sorting the innocent from the guilty (discussed below in Part III(C)(1)) and
promoting reasonably informed sentencing that minimizes unwarranted
sentencing disparities (discussed below in Part III(C)(2)). A second question
that gauges defendants’ interests is structural: whether there are clear judicial
standards to review the prosecutor’s decision not to disclose that can be
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. at 453–54 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Fisher, supra note 168, at 1, 6–11.
231
For this reason, in Dist. Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, the Supreme
Court, which applied the Medina test in considering a modern question – defendants’ postconviction rights to access a DNA evidence – should have instead used a modern due process
balancing test. 557 U.S. 52, 69 (2009).
232
See, e.g., Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1309, 1322 (2012).
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enforced before the guilty plea (discussed below in Part III(C)(3)). The
competing social interests are measured by whether the production of pre-plea
discovery would impose undue costs on society (discussed below in Part
III(C)(4)).
1. Promoting Accuracy in Adjudication
To apply Brady to pre-plea discovery, I begin with Brady’s materiality
requirement, which asks how the withheld information might have changed
the trial or sentencing outcome.233 Because plea bargaining puts the onus of
adjudication and sentencing on defendants instead of juries and judges, the
structural critique suggests that we ask how the withheld information might
have changed the plea agreement.
First, consider how withheld information might have changed the outcome
of the proceedings in terms of innocence or guilt. A jury, to convict, would
see and hear all the witnesses, listen to the entire trial, weigh all the evidence
and argument, and ultimately decide whether the government had proved its
case beyond a reasonable doubt. Because a plea bargaining defendant
performs this task instead of the jury, the key issue is how the withheld
information might have affected the defendant’s decision to plead guilty.
The Supreme Court has used similar reasoning to adapt the right to
effective assistance of counsel, which is a trial-based right, to plea bargaining.
In Hill v. Lockhart, the High Court held that a defendant who had pleaded
guilty due to ineffective assistance of counsel could show that he had been
prejudiced by demonstrating a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial.”234 Prejudice was to be measured both subjectively235 and objectively. 236
Hill’s materiality test, although not explicitly analyzed in terms of
separation of powers principles and getting sufficient information into the
hands of the adjudicator, is consistent with this Article’s approach. Just as the
due process materiality standard looks to how withheld information might
have affected the jury verdict or sentence, the Sixth Amendment right to
See Part II(B), supra.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
235
Id. (“Petitioner did not allege in his habeas petition that, had counsel correctly informed
him about his parole eligibility date, he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted on going
to trial.”).
236
Id. at 59–60 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984).
233
234
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effective assistance of counsel looks to how information that defense counsel
incompetently failed to convey to the defendant might have affected the
defendant’s decision to plead guilty. 237 The similarities between these two
standards is no coincidence: the Supreme Court, in formulating its Strickland
v. Washington materiality standard (later adopted in Hill), explicitly drew on
Brady’s materiality standard.238 That the materiality tests are so similar should
come as no surprise, because both of them are designed to prevent a
breakdown in the adversarial process which happens when the defendant lacks
sufficient information. 239 And both of these rights are too fundamental to be
“lost in translation” from our old trial-based system to our system of pleas.
Several circuit courts have formulated materiality rules applying Brady to
pre-plea discovery. These rules borrow from the same logic of Strickland and
Hill’s materiality standards that look to how the withheld information affected
the defendant. For example, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Sanchez
asked “whether there is a reasonable probability that but for the failure to
disclose the Brady material, the defendant would have refused to plead and
would have gone to trial.”240 This is an objective test that focuses on “the
likely persuasiveness of the withheld information,”241 presumably to a
reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes.242
The Sanchez test has been criticized for focusing on the defendant’s state
of mind instead of on whether the undisclosed evidence undermines the
court’s confidence in whether the defendant who pleads guilty is actually
guilty. 243 To be sure, any materiality test ought to help to sort the factually
innocent from factually guilty defendants. But that argument does not address
Petegorsky, supra note 203, at 3636; see also Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012);
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012), Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
238
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 694 (drawing on Brady in formulating its materiality
standard).
239
Id. at 685–87.
240
United States v. Sanchez, 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing White v. United
States, 858 F.2d 416, 422 (8th Cir.1988); Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1319–22 (2d Cir.
1988) (citing Hill v. Lockhart). See also Conte, supra note 34, at 92 & n. 94 (2012).
241
Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1454, citing Miller, 848 F.2d at 1322.
242
The First Circuit has also applied an objective test. Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278,
294 (1st Cir. 2006), found in Cassidy, Plea supra note 52.
243
Douglass, Can supra note 92, at 588–89 (2007) (“The question is not whether defendant
made an informed choice to plead guilty. The question is whether undisclosed Brady evidence
undermines our confidence in the adjudication of guilt that is based on that plea.”).
237
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the core structural problem of plea bargaining: defendants who plead guilty
have to act as their own judge and jury. And the objectivity of Sanchez’s
materiality test allows courts to consider whether undisclosed exculpatory
evidence would have caused a reasonable defendant not to plead guilty.
For reasons already explained, my proposed balancing test must be
conducted from a pre-trial perspective to be useful in evaluating the
sufficiency of pre-plea discovery. 244 Thus, instead of using Brady’s post-trial
materiality test, I borrow pre-trial materiality tests from one of the right to
information cases discussed above in Part II(C). In Trombetta v. California,
the court imposed a law enforcement duty to preserve evidence that “might be
expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense.”245 The pre-trial
test is necessary to empower judges to check prosecutorial discovery
discretion before a guilty plea. Finally, evidence which prosecutors think is
inculpatory might actually be or become mitigating or exculpatory with proper
defense investigation and preparation. This weighs in favor of a broad preplea discovery regime.
2. Informed Sentencing and Unwarranted Disparities
Next, consider how information withheld by the prosecutor might have
changed the sentence in a case. The sentencing judge considers everything the
jury hears at trial, information that was excluded from trial under the law of
evidence, and a wide variety of other information that comes to light during
pre-trial proceedings and at sentencing.246 Sentencing judges consider not just
the offense of conviction but the defendant’s history and character, the
defendant’s criminal history and conduct related to the offense of conviction.
They consider the equities of the case, the purposes of punishment, and how
similarly situated defendants have been treated.247 For the defendant to
perform adequately as his own judge and jury, he needs a similar amount of
information about his case.

See Part II(B), supra.
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488 (1984). See Part II(C)(1), supra.
246
See Part I(C)(2), supra.
247
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012); see also American Bar Association, Criminal Justice
Section Standards – Prosecution Function, Standard 3–6.1(a) (“The prosecutor . . . should
seek to assure that a fair and informed judgment is made on the sentence and to avoid unfair
sentence disparities.”)
244
245
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The American Bar Association has issued nonbinding guidelines for
prosecutors consistent with these principles. The guidelines direct prosecutors
to provide “complete and accurate information” to the sentencing judge,
including “any information in the prosecutor's files relevant to the
sentence.”248 To the extent that the presentence report is incomplete, the
prosecutor must make appropriate disclosures to the court and defense
counsel. 249 This guideline goes beyond Brady by requiring the disclosure of
both inculpatory and exculpatory information at sentencing and is based on
principles of fairness, accuracy, and distributive justice.
Courts have been reluctant to formulate post-trial materiality tests related
to sentencing. For example, the Sanchez test (discussed above at Part
III(B)(1), supra) relates only to guilt or innocence. Given society’s strong
interest in similarly situated defendants receiving similar sentences, a better
materiality test would also ask whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s
shoes might have still pleaded guilty on the same terms and received the same
sentence had he known about the undisclosed information.250
Perhaps one reason that courts have been reluctant to formulate a postguilty plea Brady materiality test related to sentencing is the difficulty of
formulating a remedy. Where a defendant pleads guilty based on
misinformation, a simple remedy is to allow the defendant to withdraw the
guilty plea.251 Likewise, where a plea offer lapses or is rejected due to
counsel’s incompetence, the Supreme Court has held that prejudice can be
established where the defendant shows “a reasonable probability that the end
result of the criminal process would have been more favorable by reason of a
plea to a lesser charge or a sentence of less prison time.”252 The remedy in that
situation is to force the prosecutor to re-open the former offer, and then ask if
American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Section Standards – Prosecution Function,
Standard 3–6.2(a).
249
Id.
250
Where the defendant pleaded guilty without knowledge of inculpatory evidence that would
increase the sentence, there are at least two instances where prejudice might not occur. First,
the sentencing court might allow the defendant to withdraw from the plea agreement. Second,
the sentencing court might decide not to consider the undisclosed information at sentencing.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (d)(2)(C) (allowing court to prohibit party from using evidence that
was not disclosed in violation of Rule 16).
251
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
252
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012)
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the defendant would have taken the offer and if the court would have
approved it.253
As if that weren’t hard enough, the harder case is where a lack of
discovery causes a defendant, who would have certainly pleaded guilty, to
agree to a heavier sentence than he otherwise would have. Allowing the
defendant to withdraw his plea might not make him whole because he has no
constitutional right for the prosecutor to later make a different plea offer.254
The best way to make the defendant whole might be to give him the deal that
he would have agreed to had he known of that undisclosed information.
Unfortunately, that standard might be unworkable, requiring intense judicial
supervision of plea negotiations that never occurred.255 Fortunately, one way
to sidestep and mitigate such problems is to make clear, specific rules
mandating broad pre-plea discovery for prosecutors to follow and to allow
pre-plea litigation of discovery disputes.256
3. Pre-Trial Judicial Enforcement of Discovery Rules
The proposed due process balancing test considers whether there are clear
judicial standards to review the prosecutor’s decision not to disclose that can
be enforced before the guilty plea. In the absence of these standards, the
prosecutor’s decision not to disclose is completely unchecked. The current
federal discovery regime follows this approach sometimes. For example, Rule
16 contains a mechanism for pre-trial orders enforcing required disclosures.257
And even though the Brady rule is typically enforced only after trial,
prosecutors have made use of the procedure outlined in Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie to seek the court’s pre-trial concurrence of a decision to withhold
discovery from the defense.258
Requiring pre-trial judicial supervision and review of prosecutorial
discovery decisions answers an important criticism of the Eldridge balancing
test: that it doesn’t establish a procedural floor for due process.259 Given the
historical and conceptual affinity between due process and separation of
Id. at 1410–11.
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977)
255
It would also contravene Rule 11’s policy prohibiting judicial involvement in plea
discussions. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(C)(1).
256
See Part IV(A)(2), infra.
257
FED R. CRIM. P. 16. See Part IV(A), infra.
258
See Part II(B), supra.
259
SULLIVAN, ARC supra note 76, at 94.
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powers, as well as the problems inherent in consolidating all discovery
discretion in prosecutors, it makes sense that, for pre-plea discovery, judges
should have clear discovery rules and standards that they can enforce before
the guilty plea.
4. Not Imposing Undue Costs on Society
Against the interests of the defendant and the public in fair and informed
adjudication and sentencing, my proposed test balances the interests of the
public (often through the government) in restricting pre-plea discovery. Those
interests are the administrative cost of producing evidence as well as the
potential for harm to the government’s case and witnesses by revealing the
identities of witnesses.260 Such costs are significant in many cases, and any
pre-plea discovery regime that ignores them runs the risk of grinding the
system of pleas down to a halt.
Of course, society’s interests are not mutually exclusive to those of the
defendant. Society has a strong interest in providing due process to criminal
defendants. Affording due process to all defendants helps protect the innocent,
promotes respect for the criminal law, and honors widely shared constitutional
principles that are fundamental to our democracy.
5. Whether the Supreme Court Should Adopt this Proposed Test
Although my proposed test is based on due process and separation of
powers principles, the Supreme Court could not adopt it without clarifying
certain tensions in its jurisprudence concerning the information principle. For
example, although the Court has shown concern for accurately sorting the
innocent from the guilty, that concern has only manifested itself in Brady’s
concern for fair trials; the Ruiz court incorrectly concluded that failing to
disclose impeachment evidence categorically posed no danger to the accuracy
of guilty pleas. Still, because Ruiz drew a sharp distinction between
impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence generally, the Supreme
Court could still find a generalized pre-plea Brady duty that helps protect the
innocent from pleading guilty. 261
Additionally, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected a general right
to discovery that would help defendants effectively prepare a defense, assess
the strength of the government’s case, and understand the likely sentencing
260
261

United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002).
Many commentators have advocated for this. See, e.g., Lain, Accuracy, supra note 21, at 5.
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consequences of a guilty plea versus a jury trial. 262 This rejection is in tension
with several Due Process and Compulsory Process cases discussed above in
Part II that uphold the right of defendants, under certain circumstances, to
receive information – exculpatory or not – in the government’s possession that
is material to the preparation of their defense.
The Court has recently emphasized in Ruiz that the Brady rule is not
enforceable pre-trial. However, several of the Court’s cases in other contexts
have asked whether certain material is likely to play a significant role in the
preparation of the defense. 263 Likewise, Rule 16 itself requires disclosures of
certain materials that are material to the preparation of the defense, although
the rule puts no time limit on that disclosure requirement.264
The difficulty in formulating constitutional rules relating to pre-plea
discovery is that the delicate balancing of competing interests does not lend
itself to simple, black letter rules. The Court’s attempts to formulate specific
discovery rules that go beyond Brady have not been successful. For example,
in Jencks v. United States, the Court announced a new rule pursuant to its
supervisory power: that when a witness testified at trial on direct examination,
the government had to disclose to the defense any prior inconsistent
statements.265 Lower courts began to elaborate upon that rule, spawning
uncertainty and complexity. 266 Congress responded with the Jencks Act, a
similar but more narrow and inflexible rule.267 In subsequently upholding the
Jencks Act, the High Court recognized that its authority to create nonconstitutionally-mandated discovery rules existed only where Congress had
not acted.268 Congress’ general supremacy over criminal procedural
rulemaking is premised on its superior capacity as a democratic branch to
make uniform, detailed rules that balance defendants’ and society’s interests
in criminal discovery.
Finally, the Supreme Court’s plea bargaining jurisprudence has
consistently prioritized the public’s interest in maximizing plea bargains over
See discussion of Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) above in Part II(B).
See Part II, supra.
264
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i) and (F)(iii).
265
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
266
Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 346 & n. 3 (1959).
267
Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012).
268
Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 & n. 11 (1959).
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the due process interests of the public and defendants.269 Still, the Court has
recently extended the right to effective assistance of counsel to the plea
bargaining stage and conceded that plea bargaining “is the criminal justice
system.”270 Perhaps future decisions based on that concession will cause the
pendulum to swing back the other way.
Even if my proposed test is not adopted by the Supreme Court, it can still
provide helpful guidance to other rulemaking bodies, like Congress, the
Department of Justice, and district court judges, in formulating rules of preplea discovery. In Part IV, I also discuss how my structural/due process test
validates the local rules relating to pre-plea discovery in several district courts.
IV. INNOVATIVE DISTRICT COURT RULES REQUIRING
BROAD PRE-PLEA DISCOVERY
My proposed structural/due process balancing test for pre-plea discovery
gives specific guidance to courts in evaluating whether pre-plea discovery
regimes comport with due process. My test also explains why the local
discovery rules in several districts are consistent with the Constitution. In this
section I highlight several key features of these rules: (1) they have broader
disclosure standards than Brady or Rule 16 require; (2) they specify whole
categories of discovery outside of Rule 16 that must be disclosed; (3) they
require discovery to be provided soon after the arraignment and thus in time to
influence plea bargaining; (4) they allow prosecutors to seek the court’s
permission to defer discovery in appropriate cases; (5) they require the parties
to meet and confer about discovery issues before resorting to motions; and (6)
they are as self-executing as possible so that the defense need not file
discovery motions.
I briefly discuss how, in districts that have not adopted broad pre-plea
discovery, individual judges can accomplish the same results by issuing
discovery orders in every case.
Finally, I mention a few proposals outside of local rulemaking for
implementing the policies behind my balancing test,271 with the aim of

See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357
(1978), United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002).
270
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as
Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
271
See Part III(C), supra.
269
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promoting uniform and broad pre-plea discovery throughout the federal
system.
A. Local Rules
Many district courts, responding to the need for clarity in regulating preplea discovery, have implicitly weighed the same concerns that my balancing
test addresses272 and taken advantage of Rule 57’s broad rulemaking
authority.
1. How Criminal Procedural Rules Are Made
Congress and the courts jointly regulate discovery through a rulemaking
process established by the Rules Enabling Act.273 A committee made up of
Supreme Court and federal judges drafts rules; the public has an opportunity
to comment on the rules; the rules are revised accordingly and transmitted to
the Supreme Court for approval. The Supreme Court transmits the rules to
Congress, which must act on the rules within six months or they automatically
go into effect.274
To allow fine tuning of these rules, Congress has granted local rulemaking
power to the district courts under Rule 57 and 28 U.S.C. § 2071. Through
these statutes, Congress has re-allocated substantial rulemaking authority to
the district courts, 275 allowing district courts to make rules governing the
practice in their own districts.
2.
Significant Innovations in Local Rules Related to Pre-Plea Discovery
A survey of these local rules reveals an overarching theme of constraining
prosecutorial discretion through district court regulation of pre-plea discovery.
See Part III(C), supra.
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
274
See Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV.
1655 (1995) (describing the federal rulemaking process in detail), found in JAMES W. MOORE
ET AL., MOORE’ S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 801.04[5] (3d ed,. 1997). See also 28 U.S.C. §2072(b)
(2012)(“Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in
conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken
effect.”)
275
Linda J. Rusch, Separation of Powers Analysis As A Method for Determining the Validity
of Federal District Courts' Exercise of Local Rulemaking Power: Application to Local Rules
Mandating Alternative Dispute Resolution, 23 CONN. L. REV. 483, 485 (1991) [hereinafter
Rusch]. Local civil rules have had wide variation. Id., see also COMMITTEE ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE
LOCAL RULES PROJECT: LOCAL RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE (1989) (reviewing civil rules and
finding wide variety).
272
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Because district courts have inherent authority to enforce their own local
rules, they give the defense an immediate enforcement remedy for discovery
violations and thus increase the likelihood that the defense will have the
discovery it needs in time for plea bargaining.
First, many districts have a broader standard of materiality for pre-trial
discovery than Brady (or even Rule 16)276 requires. For example, the District
of Vermont requires disclosure of “[a]ll information and material known to
the government that may be favorable to the defendant on the issues of guilt or
punishment, as provided by Brady v. Maryland,” within fourteen days of
arraignment.277 That phrase, “may be favorable,” is a pre-trial standard much
broader than the Bagley materiality standard, which requires “a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of
the proceeding [as determined post-trial] would have been different.”278
Similarly, the District of Massachusetts requires broad disclosure of
“exculpatory information” within 28 days of arraignment, although certain
categories of exculpatory information need not be turned over until just before
trial. 279 “Information” is a broader category than admissible evidence, and by
definition, it need not be “material” under Brady and Bagley, because it must
be turned over long before trial. From this pre-trial (and typically pre-plea)
perspective, exculpatory information is information that casts doubt on the
government’s case, without having to determine how its nondisclosure might
affect the case’s outcome.280
276
As a point of comparison, Rule 16 sets forth a broader materiality standard than Brady for certain
categories of discovery by requiring the prosecution to produce certain documents, objects, and reports
of examinations and tests if they are “material to preparing the defense” or if “the government intends
to use the item in its case-in-chief at trial.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. (a)(1)(E)(i), (a)(1)(E)(ii) and (F)(iii).
Under Rule 16, evidence is “material” if “there is a strong indication that it will play an important role
in uncovering admissible evidence, aiding witness preparation, corroborating testimony, or assisting
impeachment or rebuttal.” United States v. Lloyd, 992 F.2d 348, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
277
D. Vermont L R Crim P 16(a)(2).
278
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (1985).
279
LR, D. Mass. 116.2(a) (defining “exculpatory information” to include information that
tends to cast doubt on defendant's guilt, including impeachment evidence, or diminish the
degree of the defendant's culpability). D. Conn. L.Cr. R. 16(a) and Standing Order on
Discovery (paragraph (A)(11)) (requiring disclosure of “All information known to the
government which may be favorable to the defendant on the issues of guilt or punishment
within the scope of Brady” within 14 days of arraignment.)
280
LR, D. Mass. 116.2(a)
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Second, many districts have local rules that specify whole categories of
documents and information to be turned over, regardless of their content.
These rules increase the flow of information to the defense by forcing
prosecutors to make disclosures without the need for pre-trial guessing about
post-trial materiality. The categories of information include: all Rule 16
discovery, 281 search warrant documents,282 electronic surveillance
materials, 283 names and addresses of witnesses,284 impeachment (Giglio)
information,285 consensual interceptions, 286 audio and visual recordings
related to the charges, 287 the identity of unindicted co-conspirators,288 an
inventory of all items seized by law enforcement,289 and information
concerning lineups and photo identification procedures, regardless of whether
the defendant was identified.290 Such information can be tremendously helpful
in preparing the defense. Rules requiring disclosure of specified categories of
material spare the defense from the often insurmountable hurdle of finding out
whether a piece of discovery exists or proving that it could be helpful to the
defense.291
These local discovery rules follow Rule 16’s general approach of
specifying whole categories of discovery to be turned over before trial. Rule
16’s categories include the defendant’s statement, documents and objects, and
reports of scientific examinations and tests and expert witness reports. These
items must be disclosed without any need for prosecutors to determine
whether they are inculpatory or exculpatory. Broad discovery of pre-defined
See, e.g., U.S.Dist.Ct.D.Vt., L. Cr. R 16(a)(2); U.S.Dist.Ct.D.Mass., L. Cr. R 116.1(c)(1)(A).
See, e.g., U.S.Dist.Ct.D.Vt., L. Cr. R 16(a)(4); D. Conn. L.Cr. R. 16(a) and Standing Order on
Discovery (paragraph (A)(7)); U.S.Dist.Ct.D.Mass., L. Cr. R 116.1(c)(1)(B)
283
See, e.g., U.S.Dist.Ct.D.Vt., L. Cr. R 16(a)(5); D. Conn. L.Cr. R. 16(a) and Standing Order on
Discovery (paragraph (A)(8)); U.S.Dist.Ct.D.Mass., L. Cr. R 116.1(c)(1)(C)
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See, e.g., U.S.Dist.Ct.D.Vt., L. Cr. R 16(a)(3) (“The government may withhold the names and/or
addresses or those witnesses about whom it has substantial concerns” and must notify the defense if it
does so); D. Conn. L.Cr. R. 16(a) and Standing Order on Discovery (paragraph (A)(9)); N.D.W.V. LR
Cr P 16.07-16.08 (List of witnesses and trial exhibits).
285
D. Conn. L.Cr. R. 16(a) and Standing Order on Discovery (paragraph (A)(10))
286
U.S.Dist.Ct.D.Mass., L. Cr. R 116.1(c)(1)(D)
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D.Nev. Crim. R. 16–1(b)(1)(A); D. Vt. Loc. R. 16(a)(4).
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U.S.Dist.Ct.D.Mass., L. Cr. R 116.1(c)(1)(E)
289
NDGa LCrR 16.1,
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U.S.Dist.Ct.D.Mass., L. Cr. R 116.1; see also D. Conn. L.Cr. R. 16(a) and Standing Order on
Discovery (paragraph (A)(12)); U.S.Dist.Ct.D.Mass., L. Cr. R 116.1(c)(1)(F).
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FED R. CRIM. P. 16 (1974 Advisory Committee Notes).
281
282

Structuring Pre-Plea Criminal Discovery

[11/10/15]

categories of evidence also assumes that pre-trial disclosures help the defense
prepare for trial, providing juries and judges with an effective adversarial
presentation.
Third, several local rules require disclosure early in the case, which would
help the defense to prepare for plea bargaining in most federal cases. 292
Districts with this type of provision most often required discovery to be
provided within fourteen days of arraignment.293 Some districts required
discovery to be provided at arraignment.294 Some districts establish a separate
deadline for the disclosure of certain materials, such as impeachment
information, that are typically not known to the government until just before
trial. 295 These deadlines pegged to the arraignment stand in stark contrast to
Rule 16’s silence regarding timing of pre-trial disclosures.296
Fourth, several districts have established presumptively broad discovery
regimes but allow prosecutors to obtain court orders as needed exempting
them from compliance.297 This type of provision seems to assume that run-ofthe-mill federal cases do not contain any or much discovery that cannot
reasonably be provided to the defense early in the case.
Federal criminal cases on average take 6.5 months from filing to disposition. Federal Justice
Statistics, 2009 (Bureau of Justice Statistics), December 2011
(http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf), p.9. Federal immigration cases, which as a group
resolve more quickly than any other kind of federal case, usually take at least two months to resolve on
a plea deal. See Immigration Offenders in the Federal Justice System, 2010 (Bureau of Justice
Statistics), revised October 22, 2013 (http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/iofjs10.pdf), p.25.
(http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2014/FY13_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf.)
293
See, e.g., D. Vt., ED Wash, Montana, Nebraska, W.D. Tex, M.D. Tenn; see also D. of Hi. L. R.
Crim. P. 16.1(a) (within seven days of arraignment), D. of Neb. L. R. Crim. P. 16.1(a)(3) (ten days); D.
Mass (30 days)
294
W.D. Penn., Local Criminal Rule 16(B), SD Alabama LR 16.13(b)(1)
295
See, e.g., D. of Mass. L. R. Crim. P. 116.2(b)(2); cf. Utah – comply with Rule 16 14 days before
trial.
296
In fact, such rules may contradict the Jencks Act, too.
297
Deal, Brady supra note 21, at 1812 (“my approach identifies the concrete harm that early
disclosure poses to the adversarial system and asks prosecutors to weigh that harm against the
costs of keeping favorable evidence from the jury given the particular facts of the case.”). One
example of this, as the Ruiz court pointed out, turning over witness related information can be
tailored to the case at hand, citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 3432 (2012) (“such list of the veniremen and
witnesses need not be furnished if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that
providing the list may jeopardize the life or safety of any person.”). Rule 16 contains a
provision allowing prosecutors to seek such orders. FED R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1).
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Fifth, several districts have local rules requiring the prosecution and
defense to meet and confer about discovery early in the case.298 Some districts
require the parties to meet and confer before filing a discovery motion. 299 In
Massachusetts, if the prosecution declines to turn over particular items of
discovery, the prosecution must provide defense counsel and the court its
reasons. Only then can the defense file a discovery motion. 300 These rules
encourage open dialogue between the parties and should help the defense to
become aware of potential discovery issues. They also may tend to discourage
the filing of discovery motions which increase litigation costs and therefore
tend to reduce the available benefits to both parties from negotiated plea
agreements.
Sixth, these local rules are as self-executing as possible. They may require
the prosecutor to certify on the record that all discovery required by the local
rules has been timely provided.301 Similarly, some rules require the
prosecution to file statements certifying compliance with discovery
requests.302 They may set a rebuttable presumption that the defense has
requested discovery, 303 instead of requiring the defense to prove under Rule
16 that it has requested the appropriate discovery. 304 Other districts, notably
See, e.g., D. Ak. L. R. Crim. P. 16.1(a), D.D.C. L. R. Crim. P. 16.1.
See, e.g., D.Minn.LR 12.1(b); D. Ut. Crim R 16–1(a).
300
See, e.g., D. Mass. L. R. Crim. P. 116.3(f).
301
See D. Ut. L. R. Crim. P. 16–1(f) and (h)(party from whom discovery is requested must
file a notification of compliance); Neb. Loc. Crim. R. 16.1(a)(4) (“Upon providing the
required discovery, the government must file and serve a notice of compliance.”); E.D. Okla.
LCrR 16.1(A)(1) (requiring prosecutor to put the status of discovery on the record at
arraignment with specificity). See also Jason Kreag, The Brady Colloquy, 67 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 47 (2014) (proposing that judges question prosecutors on the record regarding their
compliance with Brady obligations).
302
See, e.g., D. Hi. LCrR16.1(b) (requiring prosecutor to file a signed statement with the court
of any refusal to provide requested discovery).
303
E.g. LR, D. Mass. 116.1(b) (“A defendant shall be deemed to have requested all the
discovery authorized by Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A)-(F) unless that defendant files a Waiver
of Request for Disclosure”), E.D. Wash LCrR 16(a); see also D. Haw. CrimLR 16.1(7) (“[I]t
shall be presumed that defendant has made a general [Brady] request.”); D. Kan., General
Order of Scheduling and Discovery (“In general, the court will order the parties to comply
with Rules 12, 12.1, 12.2, 16 and 26.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, with Brady
[and its progeny], and with Title 18, U.S.C. § 3500, as well as Rule 404(b), Federal Rules of
Evidence. A request is not necessary to trigger the operation of the Rules and the absence of a
request may not be asserted as a reason for noncompliance.”).
304
FED R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1) and (c)(2).
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Nevada, require the parties to agree on their own discovery schedule,
enforceable by the court.305 This reduces the need for defense motions and
simply creates an expectation, enforceable by the court, that discovery will be
provided.306
These provisions make a record of the defense’s reliance on the
prosecutor’s representation that required discovery has been provided or does
not exist. That reliance has important legal consequences. First, a plea was
involuntary unless “entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences,
including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court,
prosecutor, or his own counsel.” A plea induced by misrepresentation may
also be rendered involuntary.307 Thus, the plea may be rendered involuntary
where the prosecutor inaccurately represents the state of discovery preceding a
guilty plea.
The second legal consequence is that defense reliance on the prosecutor’s
representation broadens Brady’s materiality standard. Under the reasoning of
Bagley, if the defendant makes a specific request for Brady material and does
not receive it, the Court is more likely to find that defense counsel
detrimentally relied on the prosecution’s explicit or implicit representation
that the requested discovery did not exist.308 Thus, when the defense requests
a certain class of material, or the local rules require its automatic production,
the prosecution has less room to err in determining whether the information is
“material” for Brady purposes.309 Because prosecutors have a hard time
making this determination anyway, 310 rules mandating broad disclosure allow
prosecutors to avoid prophesying about post-trial materiality.
An important question about these local rules is what effect they are
actually having on the criminal justice system in their respective districts. The
fact that such rules have been adopted in dozens of districts throughout the

D.Nev. L.Cr. R. 16–1.
See also Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xxxiv (2015)
(proposing that local rules require discovery without the need for defense motions).
307
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 755 (citation omitted).
308
See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682–83.
309
6 LAFAVE, CRIMINAL supra note 85, at § 24.3(b) [“Specific Request Element”]. Deal,
Brady supra note 21, at 1792 (discussing Stevens’ dissent in Bagley justifying less stringent
materiality standard where the defense has actually requested the information).
310
See Part I(C)(2), supra.
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country since the 1990s311 is a strong indication that the sky has not fallen.
But empirical data about the effects of these local rules is not yet available.312
In summary, these innovative local rules are designed to put adequate
information in the hands of the defense in time for plea negotiations, and
judges can enforce these rules before the guilty plea with minimal litigation.
These rules are consistent with my due process test for pre-plea discovery, and
they do not appear to exert a significant drag on the system’s ability to process
virtually all its cases through guilty pleas, although more research needs to be
done.
B. Standing Orders and Case-Specific Discovery Orders
Even in districts which have not promulgated good local discovery rules, a
judge may regulate her judicial practice “in any manner consistent with
federal law, these rules, and the local rules of the district.”313 Thus, on a caseby-case basis or through the use of standing orders, judges can regulate preplea discovery.
Although a full discussion of the district courts’ inherent authority to
regulate discovery is beyond the scope of this paper, federal courts retain
“strong inherent power, completely aside from the powers Congress expressly
conferred in the Rules.”314 The Supreme Court has stated, in formulating its
own discovery rule through common law methods, that it has “power, in the
absence of statutory provision, to prescribe procedures for the administration
of justice in the federal courts.”315 Lower courts have likewise recognized this
authority. 316 In fact, the Advisory Committee stated that Rule 16 was “not

See, e.g., S.D. of Florida Local Rule 88.10 (adopted December 1, 1994); D. Mass. Local Rules
116.1 (adopted September 1, 1990); and E.D. Penn. Local Rule 16.1 (effective January 1, 1998).
312
In a future paper, I intend to study this issue by interviewing criminal practitioners in several
districts that have adopted strong pre-plea discovery regimes.
313
FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b).
314
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1965) (citation omitted).
315
Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 345 (1959) (cited in Jenny Roberts, Too Little,
Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in
Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1122 n.116 (2004)).
316
United States v. Fletcher, 74 F.3d 49, 54 (4th Cir. 1996) (recognizing court's inherent
authority to order pretrial disclosure of list of government witnesses); United States v. Moore,
936 F.2d 1508, 1515 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); United State v. Stubblefield, 325 F. Supp. 485
(E.D. Tenn. 1971) [cited in David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility,
26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 455, 503 (1999)].
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intended to limit the judge's discretion to order broader discovery in
appropriate cases.”317
Some judges have issued blanket, standing discovery orders in all their
criminal cases. For example, one California judge, in a district that already has
a local rule requiring discovery to be provided within fourteen days of
arraignment,318 has routinely required the parties to provide all requested
discovery “without unreasonable delay.”319 His order carries express warnings
of penalties for failure to comply, including exclusion of evidence.320
A similar example can be found in the District Court for the District of
Columbia. It was in that District that the Department of Justice conducted a
high profile corruption investigation of Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska, and
the case ultimately had to be dismissed because of Brady violations. Emmett
G. Sullivan, District Judge in the District of Columbia, issues a Brady
compliance order in each case requiring the “timely” production of all Brady
material. 321 In contrast, other district courts have refused to issue Brady orders
on the grounds that Brady is a “self-executing responsibility.”322
An advantage to these orders is that they are well-suited to the exigencies
of plea bargaining. By clarifying the parties’ discovery obligations, they
theoretically reduce litigation. Although it is not clear whether these Brady
orders result in more discovery being turned over to the defense, prosecutors
are not likely to resist them (except in cases where early compliance would
prejudice the government’s interests), either because those prosecutors
planned on providing the discovery anyway, or they do not want to be seen as
unjustly withholding discovery.
18 U.S.C. app. § [p. 761] (Advisory Committee's Notes on Rule 16).
E.D. Cal. L.R. 440(a).
319
Senior District Judge Lawrence K. Karlton used this same standing order for years, the
violation of which “may result in the imposition of sanctions including, but not limited to,
monetary sanctions, the exclusion of evidence, or the striking of testimony or documents.”
United States v. Valencia-Mendoza et al., No. 09-cr-408 LKK (E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2009).
320
Id.
321
http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/dcd/sites/dcd/files/StandingBradyOrder.pdf, accessed on
October 2, 2014.
322
United States v. Flores, No. CR 08–0730 WHA, (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2011). See also
United States v. Avellino, 129 F. Supp. 2d 214, 220 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Absent some type of
indication, however, that the government is not discharging its Brady obligations, there is no
need for the Court to undertake the requested in camera review and, for that reason, the Court
declines to do so. [citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 59]”).
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In addition to or instead of standing orders, district judges can issue casespecific pre-trial orders regulating discovery. These orders usually issue in
response to defense motions. Such motions are relatively rare, for several
reasons. First, the defense may not be aware of even the general nature of the
discovery that has withheld. Second, where the defendant’s goal is a plea
agreement, filing a motion risks prolonging the litigation and incentivizing
prosecutors to make less generous plea offers to defendants who file discovery
motions.
A practical problem with standing discovery orders, Brady compliance
orders, and case-specific orders is that meaningful appellate review of such
orders can be difficult. Direct appeal of pre-trial discovery orders may not be
available, although the prosecution might seek a writ of mandamus.323 District
courts do not have consistent standards for their application of inherent
powers. The fact-intensive nature of these situations implies that appellate
review will be deferential, as for abuse of discretion, but the contours of such
discretion are still undefined.324
C. Recommendations
Our federal pre-plea discovery regime does not provide sufficient
structural protections to defendants. The system must be re-balanced; judges
need a greater role in enforcing due process-based rights to pre-plea
discovery. 325 For reasons stated above in Part III(C)(5), the Supreme Court is
not likely to constitutionalize comprehensive pre-plea discovery. The
Supreme Court could, however, act in its rulemaking capacity to transmit
amendments to Rule 16 to Congress in line with the innovative local
discovery rules discussed above in Part IV(A).
That failing, district courts can continue to promulgate their own local
discovery rules. Such rules have a decades-long track record in districts

United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2001).
See Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 763 (1982)
(cited in Behar at 1809).
325
I and other scholars have proposed other procedures that would facilitate this. See Daniel
S. McConkie, Judges as Framers of Plea Bargaining, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 61 (2015);
see also, e.g., Susan R. Klein, Monitoring the Plea Process, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 559 (2013).
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throughout the country. The District of Massachusetts has one of the best and
most comprehensive local discovery rules regimes in the country.326
In the meantime, judges in districts without such rules can enter sua
sponte Brady compliance orders and discovery orders in every criminal
case.327
Congress could also pass reform legislation outside of the Rules Enabling
Act. For example, one recent bill, the Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act
of 2012,328 would have required the prosecution to immediately disclose
material that reasonably appeared to be favorable to the defendant as to guilt
or innocence, sentencing, or any preliminary matter. The immediacy
requirement would create an enforceable pre-plea discovery obligation. The
government could seek a protective order to defer discovery in appropriate
cases. 329 Unfortunately, this bill died in Committee.
Finally, the Department of Justice has a role to play here as well. It can
give its line prosecutors stronger and more detailed directives regarding preplea discovery, and it can prosecutors follow these directives by providing
sufficient training and administering internal discipline where necessary to
those who do not.
CONCLUSION
This article’s structural framework for assessing pre-plea discovery
provides a novel way of appraising our plea bargaining procedure. Plea
bargaining generally, and the current pre-plea discovery regime specifically,
weaken the structural protections that criminal defendants and the public
should enjoy. Most people would agree that all government actors should be
“checked” in some way; that the concentration of too much power in the
hands of prosecutors – the vast majority of whom are well-meaning – is
dangerous. My structural critique and its associated due process balancing test
For a discussion of several Massachusetts provisions, see Part IV(A)(2), supra.
See Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xxxiii
(2015) (recommending that judges enter Brady compliance orders in every criminal case).
328
See also S. 2197, 112th Cong., 2d Sess. (2012) available at
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s2197/text.
329
See A Call for Congress to Reform Federal Criminal Discovery, THE CONSTITUTION
PROJECT, (2012) available at
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/CallforCriminalDiscoveryReform.pdf; Bruce A.
Green, Federal Criminal Discovery Reform: A Legislative Approach, 64 MERCER L. REV. 639
(2013) (detailed policy analysis of Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012); see also
Powell, supra note 293, at 363–64.
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explain why judges and legislatures should have a greater role in checking
prosecutors. Putting more discovery into the hands of the defense is an
important check on prosecutorial power because it allows defendants to
prepare a defense and to plea bargain with a better understanding of their
likely sentencing exposure.
Of course, such changes do not actually restore structural protections; they
merely attempt to approximate what has been lost. Without a jury trial, the
criminal justice system will never work as originally intended. Many scholars
have argued that the trial penalty, which incentivizes defendants to waive their
separation of powers protections like the jury trial, is unconstitutional. 330 The
Supreme Court has not agreed.331 It must certainly be the case that plea
bargaining is unconstitutional at least in the sense that our modern system of
pleas bears little resemblance to the Constitution’s design and the common
law tradition from which it came. But due process needs to look forward, not
backwards. As Justice Matthews stated in Hurtado: “[i]t is more consonant to
the true philosophy of our historical legal institutions to say that the spirit of
personal liberty and individual right . . . was preserved and developed by a
progressive growth and wise adaption to new circumstances.”332 A due
process jurisprudence that is sensitive to structural protections can balance the
interests of defendants and society at large.
Even if the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence does not catch up
with the realities of plea bargaining, other branches of government can act.
Federal prosecutors should provide broad pre-plea discovery as a matter of
Department-wide policy, not the discretion of individual prosecutors.
Congress should amend the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure along the
lines of my proposed due process balancing test to provide for broad pre-plea
discovery. But many federal district courts are not waiting on Congress, the
Supreme Court, or the Department of Justice – they have promulgated helpful
local rules that have helped inspire this Article’s analysis. Hopefully, this
structural conception of due process can make plea bargaining not just
efficient but also more fair.
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